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"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit, c. 6.*

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THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF IRELAND.

I.

Preliminary Sketch.

It is a matter of notoriety amounting to a scandal that the Irish people, quick-witted, intelligent, and devoted to learning as they have always proved themselves, were for centuries unable to obtain in their own land the advantages of such higher education as a University confers. Not from the time of the dissolution of those great medieval monastic institutions, which had been the glory of western Christianity, the training ground of the scholars of Europe, until the thirty-fourth year of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, did the State make an attempt to remedy, even in small part, so appalling a condition of affairs. In 1591 the University of Dublin was founded. It was a strictly Protestant institution, and, alike by its constitution and their own religious tenets, the vast majority of the people of Ireland were debarred from its portals. For a period of over 250 years this University, with its solitary college of Trinity, was the only University in Ireland. Maynooth College was, it is true, founded by the Irish Parliament in 1795, and received an annual grant from the public funds, but as it was a purely ecclesiastical corporation, and none but those studying for the priesthood were entitled to admission to its student body, it cannot be described as in any sense a University in the modern acceptance of that term.

The spectacle of some 8,000,000 people, of whom but a fractional minority had access to the sole Irish University, thus deprived of advantages which every other branch of the Caucasian race was enjoying, so moved the government of the day that in 1845 three Colleges of University standing were established, having their sites respectively in Belfast, Cork, and Galway. These Colleges were thrown open to students in the academic year 1849-50, and were officially combined into one University, under the title of the Queen's University of Ireland. This institution was foredoomed to failure. The Bill, which, when passed, established the Colleges, was during the second reading debate described as "a gigantic scheme of godless education," because the teaching of religion in any form was specifically prohibited. Such an idea, which is now more or less sanctioned, passively, if not actively, was in that day repellent to large numbers of all sections of Christians in the United Kingdom. The "godless" epithet stuck. The three Queen's Colleges were looked at askance by many non-Catholics, and although two of them were situated in the most Catholic parts of Ireland, Catholics were forbidden by rescript of Pius IX from sending their sons there to be educated. The whole situation was therefore decidedly unsatisfactory.

As a set-off, the Catholic University of Ireland was established, without state aid or recognition, by Newman and the Irish Catholic bishops in 1854, but after a brief, though by no means inglorious, career of some quarter of a century, it died of inanition, in fact if not in name, in the late seventies.

Therefore, while the "National" system of primary education, established in 1831, though by no means perfect, had done much to banish illiteracy, and while secondary education had been fairly satisfactorily promoted by the Intermediate Education Act, which came into operation in 1879, the University muddle continued to be as bad as ever, until the dissolution of the Queen's University in 1879 and the establishment of the Royal University of Ireland in 1881. The Queen's University was gone, but the Queen's Colleges [1] remained as

[1] American readers should note the distinction, necessarily made throughout this article, between the term "College" and the term "University."

official or semi-official appanages of the Royal University, under the designation of "approved" colleges.

The new university was from the start open to female as well as to male students, and led the way in that respect in the United Kingdom. Thus, and otherwise, it was meant to fill a larger space in Irish educational life than ever had been possible either to the abolished Queen's University or to the practically defunct Catholic University of Ireland. So, in sober fact, it did, and it must be admitted by its worst opponents that the Royal rendered good service to higher education. It had, however, one defect, out of which much capital was made. It was frequently represented to be a mere examining body, because it conferred its degrees on any one who paid its modest fees and passed its reasonably difficult examinations, while its students could pursue their studies anywhere from China to Peru. The charge was reiterated almost *ad nauseam;* but those who made it conveniently forgot that, under the fellowship scheme embodied in the original Statutes of the University, it was provided that, "if required by the Senate, the holders [of fellowships] shall give their services in teaching students of the University in some educational institution approved by the Senate, wherein matriculated students of the University are being taught."

In practice five such institutions were approved, namely: University College, Dublin, to which were allotted 15 Fellows; Queen's College, Belfast, 7; Queen's College, Cork, 3; Queen's College, Galway, 3; and Magee College, Londonderry, 1. These 29 Fellows were therefore paid their salaries of £400 a year each, not only for conducting examinations, but also for actual lectures to students. There were, in addition, eight "Medical Fellows," and many Examiners and Assistant Examiners, nearly all of whom were engaged as professors in one or other of the "approved" colleges.

These conditions would have been satisfactory enough, were it not for the facts (1) that there were large numbers of candidates for the various examinations who, prevented by some reason from attending the classes in the approved colleges,

were obliged to study privately or under private tuition, and (2) that, in addition to the "approved" colleges, there were several other colleges sending up students of their own training not only for the examinations and degrees but also for the numerous scholarships, exhibitions, and other prizes offered by the Royal University. It was felt, vaguely or acutely according to individual temperament, that both these classes of students were under more or less of a handicap. The case was put that, however fair-minded an examiner might be, it was but natural that he should display at least unconscious bias in favor of candidates or competitors who had been trained and prepared by himself, and who were therefore likely to show the impress of his methods.

For these and other reasons there was unrest and impatience in educational circles; it was generally recognized that the Irish University question was as yet far from being definitely settled. Agitation for a different and improved system was therefore continuous, and was finally successful, when, in 1908, the Liberal government decided to dissolve the Royal University, and to set up in its place two new universities.

By the Act of Parliament (8 Edw. 7, Chap. 38), which does this, permission is given to the King to found by charter two new universities in Ireland to have their respective seats at Dublin and Belfast. These universities are to be bodies corporate under such names as the King may be pleased to determine. These names have since been given: one is called the National University of Ireland, the other the Queen's University of Belfast. It is with the former that this article is to deal.

Public Documents.

In order to obtain a satisfactory idea of the National University of Ireland and of its Constituent Colleges, there are ten public documents to be studied, namely, the Irish Universities Act, 1908; the Charter of the National University of Ireland; the separate Charters of University College, Dublin, University College, Cork, and University College, Galway;

the Statute for the National University of Ireland; the separate Statutes for University College, Dublin, University College, Cork, and University College, Galway; and the Report to accompany these four Statutes. In addition, there are, of course, the Charter and the Statutes of the Queen's University of Belfast; but with these two latter documents we are not just now immediately concerned.

Irish Universities Act, 1908.

A perusal of the Act of Parliament, known as the Irish Universities Act, 1908, which establishes the new universities, shows how much its framers were hampered (1) by the existence of the Royal University of Ireland and of the Queen's Colleges at Cork and Galway, and (2) by the question of religion. Two sets of Commissioners were named in the Act, one for Dublin and the other for Belfast. The commissioners were enjoined to draw up schemes for the employment of the existing officers of the Royal University of Ireland and of the existing officers of Queen's College, Belfast, Queen's College, Cork, and Queen's College, Galway. It is further enacted that these schemes shall provide, so far as practicable and expedient, for the offer of equivalent offices, in either one of the new universities or in the new Dublin College which is to be founded, to existing officers of the Royal University of Ireland, and in Queen's College, Cork, and Queen's College, Galway, respectively, to existing officers of those colleges. In case an officer of the Royal University should not be offered an equivalent office, or should accept an office of less emolument than he had previously enjoyed, he is entitled to such compensation out of the university funds as the Commissioners shall determine. It will thus be seen that, considering the limited endowment granted to the new university and to its constituent colleges, the Commissioners had the strongest possible financial reasons for employing the former office-holders. To do otherwise would be to make an undue drain on exiguous resources in order to provide pensions or lump-sum compensation for those who

might be injuriously affected by the loss or diminution of their offices. No one will cavil at the provision thus made for the existing office-holders; on the contrary, to ignore their past services and their present claims would be most unjust, for many of them are distinguished scholars and specialists in their own departments, and are therefore capable of doing excellent work for the infant institution. The point here sought to be established is that, on account of money considerations, it is evident that the Commissioners were not as unrestricted and unhampered in their selection of professors, lecturers, and other officers as if there were no body of men in existence with legal or equitable claims on their consideration. As a matter of fact, I understand that, with scarcely an exception, the appointments actually made from among existing office-holders have given general satisfaction.

On the question of religion an even more difficult problem presented itself to the framers of the Act. This has been for years one of the great stumbling blocks in the way of the solution of the Irish university problem. The great majority of the people of Ireland is Catholic, but there is a considerable minority made up of members of the Protestant Episcopal Church, Presbyterians, Methodists, and other dissenting sects. Each of those bodies had strong claims for recognition, and the claims were necessarily conflicting; and, as it was impossible on the one hand to reconcile them or on the other to establish in the twentieth century denominational universities for each religion and sect, those responsible for the Act cut the Gordian knot by boldly declaring for undenominational institutions. So full, explicit, and emphatic is the section dealing with this point that it deserves to be quoted in full:—

"3.—(1) No test whatever of religious belief shall be imposed on any person as a condition of his becoming or continuing to be a professor, lecturer, fellow, scholar, exhibitioner, graduate, or student of, or of his holding any office or emolument or exercising any privilege in, either of the two new universities, or any constituent college; nor in connection with either of those universities or any such constituent college shall

any preference be given to or advantage be withheld from any person on the ground of religious belief.

"(2) Every professor upon entering into office shall sign a declaration in a form approved by the Commissioners jointly under this Act, securing the respectful treatment of the religious opinions of any of his class.

"(3) Nothing in this section shall apply to any professor of or lecturer in theology or divinity; provided that no test of religious belief shall be imposed by the governing body of either of the two new universities or any constituent college on any such professor or lecturer as a condition of his appointment or recognition by the governing body as such professor or lecturer."

Section 7, which deals with financial provisions and purchase of land, returns to this question so as to make it abundantly plain that public money must not be used for any form of theological teaching or religious instruction. Sub-section (4) of Section 7 reads as follows:—

"(4) Any sums paid under this section shall be applied by the governing body of the university or college, as the case may be, in accordance with their charter or statutes, but no such sum shall be applied for the provision or maintenance of any church, chapel, or other place of religious worship or observance, or for the provision or maintenance of any theological or religious teaching or study:

"Provided that nothing in this provision shall prevent the recognition by the governing body of the university of any professor of or lecturer in theology or divinity as a professor of the university so long as the professorship is founded and maintained entirely by means of private benefaction, or the use of any building belonging to the university or college for any teaching given by such professor, or for any other religious teaching no part of the cost of which is defrayed out of public funds. But no student shall be compelled to attend any such theological teaching, or religious instruction, and no professor of or lecturer in theology and divinity shall be eligible for membership of the General Board of Studies or of any Faculty other than the Faculty of Theology."

Finally, in Section 10, which allows the Intermediate Education Board for Ireland and county councils and borough councils to assist students by means of exhibitions, scholarships, bursaries, payment of fees, or otherwise, there is a proviso that in no case shall any grant under the section be subject to or conditional upon any religious qualification or be devoted to any religious purpose.

From all the foregoing it will be seen that the State takes every precaution to prevent itself from being identified with any form of sectarianism, but at the same time ensures that the term "godless" cannot be truthfully applied to any of the new institutions, since theological teaching and religious instruction may be given at private cost, provided that attendance of students at such teaching or instruction is to be entirely voluntary.

I have taken the time and the trouble to make this matter particularly clear, because it seems to me that in Catholic circles in this country there is considerable misapprehension as to the character of the new university. In daily conversation and by letters from different parts of the Union I have been asked to explain this or that point in connection with "the new Catholic University of Ireland." When I showed that it was not a Catholic, but an undenominational National University, that has been established, my vivâ voce and correspondence questioners invariably expressed surprise, some of them with characteristic American frankness. I hope that what I have now written will remove any existing doubt.

While I am on this question of religion, it may be opportune to say that, among Catholics of my own race, laymen as well as priests, on this side of the Atlantic, who, having a great love for, and interest in, Ireland and everything Irish, have endeavored to keep themselves informed of what was being done, I have heard many expressions of misgiving as to the future effect, on the faith and morals of the youth of Ireland, of the teaching of an institution into which religion, if it enters at all, can enter only as a side issue, and not, as it rightfully should, as the head and front of the whole curricu-

lum of studies. It has been further represented to me that the conditions of the tenure of a professorship make the professor virtually independent of every one; that he can teach what he pleases as long as he treats respectfully "the religious opinions of any of his class;" and that, in the departments of History and Philosophy in particular, it is quite possible for a professor, while keeping within the strict letter of his declaration, insidiously to inculcate doctrines subversive of Catholicity and even of Christianity.

My reply is that, if the new university scheme is approved by the Irish Catholic hierarchy, it ought to satisfy others. It is the duty of the Irish bishops—and they may be relied on to discharge it—to see that the spiritual interests of the university students, male and female, who belong to their flocks, shall not suffer. The means to secure this end will be devised by them. A beginning has been already made in the establishment of hostels, with episcopal sanction, under the direction of religious orders of men and women, for the accommodation of extern students. I understand, too, that students' sodalities have been already formed, or are in process of formation. On this score I think there need be no misgivings.

With regard to the question of teaching, there may be some danger; but I think it is rather theoretical than real. The fears which I heard expressed appear to be based on imperfect information. The occupants of chairs will not be so independent as some of my American friends apparently believe. The first appointments to Professorships and Lectureships in the National University and its Constituent Colleges are vested in the Dublin Commissioners, and, with certain exceptions provided in the Act, are to last for seven years or earlier death or disability of the appointee. After the functions of the Commissioners determine, the Senate of the University is to have power to appoint to all vacant Professorships and Lectureships in the University, and, subject to appeal to the King, who is the Visitor of the University, to remove the holders of such offices. In the University Senate, also, will repose the right to appoint, and, subject to similar appeal, to remove the Professors and

Lecturers of the Constituent Colleges. Both during and after the seven-year period named above, it is incumbent on the President of each constituent college to advise, remonstrate with, and admonish any Professor or Lecturer who is neglectful of his duties, or is guilty of any dereliction or breach of duty, and, if his representations are disregarded, to call the attention of the Governing Body of the College to the conduct of the offender.[2] Upon due cause shown by the Governing Body of the College, the Senate of the University may, subject as before to an appeal to the King, remove any Professor or Lecturer from his office.

There would thus appear to be efficient checks on any erratic tendency on the part of either University or College Professors and Lecturers. But, aside from these, there are other safeguards. I would, in the first place, lay emphasis on the virile

[2] A distinction is made in the Statutes between the duties and powers of the President of University College, Dublin, on the one hand, in this respect, and those of the Presidents of University College, Cork, and University College, Galway, on the other. Section 14 of Chapter IV of all three Statutes is identically the same, reading thus: "He shall advise and remonstrate with any Professor, Lecturer, or Office-bearer of the College, whenever it shall come to his knowledge that such Professor, Lecturer, or Office-bearer has been neglectful of his duties." Section 15 of the same chapter in the Statutes for University College, Cork, and University College, Galway, runs thus for both:

"Should any Professor, Lecturer, or Office-bearer of the College prove inattentive to the advice and remonstrance of the President, the President shall, after giving such Professor, Lecturer, or Office-bearer notice of his intention, and furnishing him with a copy of the official statement he proposes to make of the case, call the attention of the Governing Body to the conduct of such Professor, Lecturer, or Office-bearer."

The corresponding section in the Statute for University College, Dublin, varies somewhat from the foregoing. Here it is:

"Should any Professor, Lecturer, or Office-bearer be guilty, in the opinion of the President, of any dereliction or breach of duty, it shall be the duty of the President to admonish him, and in the event of the Professor, Lecturer, or Office-bearer disregarding such admonition, the President shall, after giving such Professor, Lecturer, or Office-bearer notice of his intention, and furnishing him with a copy of the official statement he proposes to make of the case, call the attention of the Govering Body to the conduct of such Professor or Office-bearer."

I do not know the reason for this distinction. It may of course, be accidental; but it is more likely to be deliberate and for cause. While I do not consider it important enough to affect the argument in the text, I think it right at the same time to point it out.

Catholic spirit of the Irish race. *Corruptio optimi pessima,* it is true; but the faith of the Irish people, fostered by persecution and watered with the blood of martyrs, is a plant of sturdy growth in root and branch, and it will not easily be eradicated or blighted to decay. Secondly, concerning the first appointments, I would instance those that have actually been made to the "dangerous" chairs. No unsound doctrines are likely to be preached by Mr. Magennis in Dublin or Mr. Merriman in Cork, by Dr. Cronin, who is a secular priest, by Father Finlay, who is a Jesuit, or by Dr. Fitzgibbon, who is a Franciscan. Lastly, I would again point to the ever-watchful care which the Irish Catholic bishops give to the religious interests of their spiritual children. If any heresy or false teaching is promulgated, the bishops will be quick to hear of it and prompt to take measures to stamp out the practice. There are many ways, direct and indirect, in which they could make their protest effective. In the extremely unlikely contingency of all else failing, they would have the final right to forbid attendance on lectures that tend to sap faith or morals. How the whole scheme will work out, time and experience alone can tell; but I, for one, take no pessimistic view.

Separation of Secondary from University Education.

Permission is given in the Act to the King to found by charter a new college at Dublin and either to alter the existing charters of Queen's College, Cork, and Queen's College, Galway, or to grant new charters in lieu thereof. These three colleges, to be known in future as University Colleges, are to be the Constituent Colleges of the National University. In addition, it is provided that the National University may give to its matriculated students the right to pursue their studies for its examinations, prizes, and degrees, in any other "recognized" college in Ireland. Such recognition shall be accorded either on the representation of one of the Constituent Colleges or subject to the consent of all three, and no such recognition

shall be granted to any college which prepares students for intermediate or other school examinations or gives education of an intermediate or secondary kind, or unless the University is satisfied as to the general character and financial position of the college as a whole, the adequacy in numbers and qualifications of its teaching staff, the University standard of the teaching, the adequate provision of laboratories and other appliances necessary for giving instruction in the subjects in respect of which recognition is contemplated, the conditions as to age and attainments on which students are admitted, the number of students proceeding or likely to proceed to a University degree, and the relations of the college to any other University. (*Charter of the National University of Ireland, Article III*). It does not seem probable that many Irish colleges will be thus recognized, for at present there are very few in existence that could comply with all the requirements here set forth. The principal bar will be the fact that most colleges, whether for boys or girls, which up to the present have been sending up their students for university examinations, have also an intermediate department and some of them a primary one, and the results fees paid to such colleges for those of their students who are successful at the examinations of the Intermediate Education Board form a strong financial inducement to hold on to the latter system. Thus, as the Act and the Charter doubtless contemplate, a long-needed scholastic reform will be effected in Ireland by the separation and co-ordination of secondary and university education. There are some colleges to which recognition can scarcely be denied, if they seek it, and new ones may spring into existence to meet exigencies; but the principle will not be thereby affected.

Endowments.

The state aid given to the National University of Ireland and its constituent colleges is threefold, consisting of (1) a bulk sum for purchasing lands and providing or improving the necessary buildings and equipment; (2) an annual grant; and

(3) existing buildings and property. The bulk sum so provided for the new University and for the new University College at Dublin, jointly, is £150,000; for University College, Cork, £14,000; and for University College, Galway, £6,000. The annual grant to the National University is £10,000; to University College, Dublin, £32,000; to University College, Cork, £20,000; and to University College, Galway, £12,000. The buildings of the Royal University of Ireland, together with the equipment and appurtenances thereof, except such of said buildings, if any, as may be appropriated to University College, Dublin, are to be transferred to the National University, which also gets any other real or personal property of the Royal University, except, again, such portion of said property, if any, as may be assigned to University College, Dublin. Any buildings or property held by the Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland for the purpose of Queen's College, Cork, and Queen's College, Galway, shall, by virtue of the Act, become vested in University College, Cork, and University College, Galway, respectively.

In addition to the foregoing, Section 8 of the Act provides that "the surplus of the fee fund mentioned in subsection two of section one hundred and twenty-two of the Local Government (Ireland) Act, 1898, shall, instead of being paid and applied as directed by that subsection, be paid and applied for such of the purposes of either of the new universities or any of the constituent colleges of the new university having its seat at Dublin as the Lord Lieutenant in Council may direct." Unfortunately, I have at present no means of ascertaining what the amount of the surplus here named is, or of how it is proposed to apply it. It may be a substantial amount, or it may be a negligible quantity. That it is the latter I am inclined to infer from the Report of the Dublin Commissioners which accompanies the statutes drawn up by them for the National University and each of the three constituent colleges. After stating that the main portion of the income of the National University consists of that sum of £10,000 a year which I have already mentioned, the report proceeds as follows:—

"The other items of Income of the University will consist of the Fees received from Students, and of the annual produce of such capital sum as shall accrue to the University out of the property of the Royal University of Ireland, when provision shall have been made for the payment of the Pensions and of such capital sums as may be awarded as the Compensation to which the property is liable under the provisions of the Act."

Here, it will be seen, there is no reference to the surplus of the fee fund mentioned in Section 8 of the Act, so that I am forced to the conclusion that the annual income of the university is to consist solely of £10,000, plus fees and whatever sum the property of the Royal University, handed over to the National University, may annually produce. I hope, however, that in this matter I am mistaken.

Insufficiency of Endowment.

The state grant is generally looked upon as being in most respects insufficient. Thus, the report from which I have already quoted sets out that the Commissioners were unable to make provision for the appointment of Professors and Lecturers in the National University, because they were not satisfied of the sufficiency of the funds of the University to meet the stipends to be attached to those Professorships. They had to content themselves with making provision for the appointment of Professors, Lecturers, and other Officers in the constituent colleges. And even here they found themselves cabined, cribbed, and confined owing to the inadequacy of the grant. With regard to University College, Galway, in particular, they found themselves in a very tight corner. What the report has to say on this subject is so illustrative of the meagerness of the financial provision, and so interesting in other respects as showing certain lines of policy approved by the Commissioners and certain other lines which they condemn, that I make no apology for setting it down here in full:—

"As to University College, Galway, we desire to make it

plain, in the most unmistakable manner, that the Scheme proposed in the Statute for that College does not in any degree conform to our conception of even a passable equipment for a Constituent College of the University. It represents merely a makeshift which we have found to be at the moment practicable; and since the salaries which are to be offered under it to those Professors of the College who are Fellows of the Royal University do not amount to their present incomes, it is made practicable only by throwing upon the University Funds a charge of some hundreds of pounds annually, by way of compensation, and thus hampering the University in its proper functions.

"The arrangement embodied in the Statute is to continue the majority of the existing Professors at what we cannot but regard as the inadequate salary of £350 a year each, allowing them, as at present, the fees paid by their Students. Upon a careful examination of the merits of this form of payment, we have declined to adopt it in the other two Colleges, having come to the conclusion that it is an undesirable one. Accordingly, in the Colleges of Dublin and of Cork we have established a system of fixed inclusive salaries for the Professors, the Students' fees going to the College. The arrangement which we have been obliged to continue in Galway is, therefore, not only one that is regarded by us as unsound, but it constitutes an anomaly in the framework of the University system.

"Further it cannot be taken as resting on a permanent basis. If the present Professor of Anatomy and Physiology retired on pension, as he is entitled to do at this moment, it would be difficult to find any competent person to take up the combined work of these two Chairs for a salary of £350 and fees. The existing Professor's salary is at present supplemented by the income of a Fellowship in the Royal University, an income that cannot be continued to his successor.

"A similar observation applies to the six other Professors in the College who hold offices under the Royal University. The result is that while almost every Professor in Cork has had his salary increased, Professors in Galway, whose services

have been equally meritorious, may find actual loss inflicted on them by a change which has been designed to improve the whole status of University teaching in Ireland.

"Also from the educational point of view, the arrangement which we find ourselves coerced to continue in Galway is in many respects inadequate. The President, in addition to the duties of his office, must undertake the teaching of Physics in both its branches, which, in practice, means that he must give extended teaching in Mathematical as well as in Experimental Physics. The Professor of Anatomy and Physiology has to undertake concurrently the teaching of these two arduous subjects. The Professor of English Literature has also to teach History and Philosophy. The Professor of Natural Science has to teach Botany, Zoology, Geology, and Mineralogy. For all those subjects, we have felt ourselves bound to make a much more ample provision in the University Colleges of Dublin and of Cork.

"We have added to the existing Staff of the Galway College in only one direction. We have provided for the establishment of a Professorship of Modern Irish at a salary of £300 a year, and one of Celtic Philology with a salary of £150 a year. We have done so, as we should decline to make ourselves responsible for the framing of a scheme for the equipment of a National University which did not make at least this minimum provision for the teaching of the Irish Language in the Constituent College situated in the most Irish-speaking province of Ireland. Otherwise we should have recommended simply a continuance of the existing state of things. We take no responsibility for a scheme which leaves an autonomous Constituent College of the University without Professors of History, Philosophy, and Physiology.

"To establish in the poorest part of Ireland, where no substantial help can be hoped for from wealthy benefactors, a College so undermanned and with its Professors so underpaid, appears to be so wholly opposed to the principles upon which educational efficiency should rest, as to call for such further provision from Parliament as shall furnish the College with at

least that minimum of endowment which will enable it to discharge its functions as a Constituent College of the National University of Ireland."

This declaration leaves nothing to be desired from the point of view of emphasis and clearness. I find, too, that discontent with the inadequacy of the financial provisions for the other Colleges has been elsewhere freely expressed. Thus, the Chancellor of the National University, Most Rev. Dr. Walsh, Archbishop of Dublin, in the postscript to a letter which he published in the Dublin *Freeman's Journal* of November 20th, 1909, shows that "the cleverness, or whatever one may wish to call it," of the Treasury has "through the intricacies of the Irish Universities Act, 1908, thrown upon the Colleges of Cork and Galway a number of charges from which these Colleges have hitherto been free." And in the same postscript he has the following significant sentences: "Our University College in Dublin is, no doubt, very inadequately endowed . . . Cork is badly hit. Galway, I fear, is made bankrupt. Is there to be no remedy?"

Dr. Bertram C. Windle, President of University College, Cork, complains in the local papers of November 29th, 1909, of the unsatisfactory financial provisions made for that institution. He mentions as an example that Cork gets for building purposes £14,000 and Belfast £60,000, and that, whereas Belfast has already a new chemical laboratory, Cork will have to spend practically all its exiguous building grant on the building and equipping of that necessary adjunct to the College. Dr. Windle also complains that for want of means it has not been found possible to appoint a Professor of Irish History and Economics in the College of which he is head.

I do not know whether the £150,000 assigned for the building and equipping of the National University of Ireland and of University College, Dublin, is deemed an adequate provision. To me it seems scanty enough; but, without going into that question, I think that from what I have already said it is evident that, not only is there discontent over the grants, but that there are also good grounds for it. The traditional policy

of the Imperial Parliament, or of the Treasury, as the case may be, in dealing with Irish problems and reforms has been followed, namely, to render the reform to a large extent nugatory by withholding the funds necessary for its satisfactory accomplishment. Luckily, sub-section (7) of Section 7 provides that

"Nothing in this section shall preclude any money being provided by Parliament in addition to the sums provided under this section, either in augmentation of any sums contributed for the purpose of the universities or colleges from other sources, or otherwise."

It would appear to be a prime duty of those concerned to formulate and press home a claim for such a grant as will ensure the proper equipping, staffing, and working of the National University and its Constituent Colleges.

Scholarships, Bursaries, Etc.

One of the most valuable sections of the Act is that whereby permission is given to the Intermediate Education Board for Ireland and to county councils and borough councils to assist students to a university career by the establishment of exhibitions, scholarships, and bursaries, by payment of fees, or otherwise. Hitherto many deserving Irish students were debarred from the advantages of a training in a university on account of the cost. To remedy this state of affairs the provision under notice has been made. I hope it may be taken for granted that the Intermediate Board will rise to the occasion, although here, as elsewhere, the question of finances may be expected to play a prominent part. I have no doubt that in the long run county councils and borough councils, when they come to realize the great opportunity thus afforded them to make the country what it was of yore, a veritable land of scholars, will act in this matter in that handsome manner which is expected of representative bodies. At the outset, however, there is a good deal of holding back on account of the standing of the Irish language in the National University. There has

been an acute controversy all over Ireland on this subject. The Gaelic League and the Irish-Ireland party were anxious to have Irish made a compulsory subject for admission to the University and up to a certain point in the curriculum; others thought that, in the beginning at least, it ought to be left an optional subject, lest injustice might be done to those would-be university students who had not previously learned the Irish language. The Standing Committee of the Irish Catholic bishops took the latter view, while at the same time they said that the question was one for fair argument, and even expressed the hope that the day might come when Irish would be not only compulsory but would also be the medium of instruction in the university. In the vigorous newspaper and platform war which raged on the whole question, the discussion was not confined to Ireland, for many societies with Irish sympathies and affiliations in the United States, Canada, Mexico, South America, and Australia, contributed the expression of their opinion on the matter in dispute—mostly, be it said, in favor of compulsory Irish.

One result was that 27 County Councils in Ireland and also some borough councils pledged themselves not to raise a rate-in-aid unless Irish was made compulsory. The Senate of the University, which is the governing body nominated in the charter by the King to hold office for five years from the date of the dissolution of the Royal University, has, as I understand, not arrived at any decision, but has referred the matter to the General Board of Studies. There is therefore at present a sort of deadlock in the matter of grants by county and borough councils. A beginning, however, has been made, in a very small way indeed, by the Donegal County Council, which has decided to levy a rate of one farthing in the pound to establish six scholarships. It is to be hoped that a satisfactory solution of the difficulty will be arrived at, so that the public representative bodies may find themselves free to discharge their obvious duty in the promotion of higher education in Ireland.

Relations to other Bodies.

There are necessarily in the Act sections to bring the National University into line with the Medical Act, 1886, and with the Solicitor's Act, 1877, so that its students may have the advantages conferred by those acts on other universities.

There is also a necessary section providing that any graduate of the Royal University of Ireland shall be entitled to a corresponding degree either in the National University of Ireland or in the Queen's University of Belfast, practically at his or her option, and that all terms kept and examinations passed by any graduate or undergraduate of the Royal University shall be deemed to be terms kept and examinations passed at either of the two new universities, at the applicant's choice.

Commissioners and their Powers.

The Act nominates commissioners to draw up the first statutes for the general government of the National University and the Constituent Colleges. These commissioners are Right Honourable Christopher Palles (Chairman), Alexander Anderson, John Pius Boland, Sir William Francis Butler, Denis Joseph Coffey, Stephen Gwynn, Henry Jackson, Sir John Rhŷs, The Most Reverend William Joseph Walsh, and Bertram Coghill Alan Windle. They are to hold office until the end of the year 1910, but the King may by Order in Council continue their powers for a further period not exceeding one year. After the powers of the commissioners determine, the statutes shall be made by the governing bodies of the university and colleges. It is provided that in framing the statutes the commissioners shall take into consideration any representations made to them by the governing bodies of the university or of the constituent colleges, or by any person interested in the making of any statute; but, subject to that limitation, very wide powers are given to the commissioners. They are authorised to frame statutes regulating any matter relating to the

government of the university or colleges (including the appointment and remuneration of officers) or otherwise concerning the university or colleges so far as that matter is not regulated under the Act or by the charters. At this point, however, a check on the commissioners is provided. The fact that a statute has been made and a notice specifying where copies can be obtained must be published in the *Dublin Gazette,* and the statute must be submitted to both Houses of Parliament. If either House presents a petition to the King asking to have the statute or any part of it disallowed, it shall be disallowed accordingly; but a new statute may be then made in lieu of the one rejected. Similarly, the governing body of the university or of a constituent college to which the statute relates, or any other person, corporation, or body directly affected by the statute, may petition the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland in Council to disallow the whole or any part of such statute, and the Lord Lieutenant may then refer the matter to the Irish Universities Committee, and if that Committee reports in favour of the disallowance of the statute or any part of it, the Lord Lieutenant may, by Order in Council, give effect to such report; but, as before, a new statute may be then made.

The commissioners have the power to appoint or employ such persons as they may think necessary for the execution of their duties under the Act, and the power to remove any person so appointed or employed. Their principal, if not their sole, executive officer is their Secretary, Mr. Robert Donovan, B. A., a well known and distinguished Dublin journalist, who was appointed in the autumn of 1908 at a salary of, I think, £400 a year.

The commissioners have also authority to take evidence upon any of the matters which they are directed or have power to deal with, and to make to the King a report containing any recommendations which in their opinion ought to be made for the purpose of better enabling them to carry out any of the powers entrusted to them. In both matters they have already exercised their authority.

Pensions.

The commissioners have also exercised their function in the matter of making the first appointment to all offices in the National University and its constituent colleges. These appointments, except in certain specified cases, are temporary only, and are to last for seven years from the 1st of November, 1909, but any officer retiring on the expiration of that period is eligible for re-appointment. Any person who, previous to appointment in the National University or in one of its constituent colleges, was an existing officer of the Royal University or of Queen's College, Cork, or Queen's College, Galway, and to whose case the Superannuation Acts, 1834 to 1892, apply, is entitled to a retiring pension or gratuity, to be paid out of the funds of the university or college of which he is an officer when the pension or gratuity becomes payable. Further, it is provided that the governing body of the National University or of any of its constituent colleges may, otherwise than in pursuance of the subsection which deals specifically with the question of pensions, give a superannuation allowance to any officer holding an office to which the Superannuation Acts already mentioned apply. On this subject of retiring pensions the Act seems to be framed in the proper spirit, and to make fair provision for the old age or failing health of public servants.

Appeals.

A committee of the Privy Council in Ireland, styled the Irish Universities Committee, is constituted by the Act. It is to consist of not less than five members of the Privy Council, and at least two of them must be persons who are or have been judges of the Supreme Court. The principal function of this committee appears to be to hear appeals against any scheme of the Commissioners relating to the transfer of property and against any scheme in relation to existing officers or any determination of the Commissioners with respect to the payment of compensation.

Accounts.

The governing body of the National University and of each of its constituent colleges must prepare an annual account of all receipts and expenditures, capital and income, and submit same to the Controller and Auditor-General to be audited, certified, and reported upon, and each such account, with the report of the Controller and Auditor-General thereon, must be laid before the House of Commons.

Governing Body.

The governing body of the National University for five years from the 1st of November, 1909, shall consist "of such number of persons nominated by His Majesty as His Majesty determines, and after the expiration of that time be constitued in manner provided by the First Schedule of this Act." The Charter specifies that this governing body shall be styled the Senate. As nominated by the King in the Charter the present Senate consists of 39 persons. As provided in the First Schedule to the Act, the Senate shall, on the expiration of the period of five years named above, consist of 35 persons, the number being made up thus:—

The Chancellor of the University,	1
The Presidents of the Constituent Colleges,	3
Persons nominated by His Majesty, of whom one at least shall be a woman,	4
Elected by the Governing Body of University College, Dublin, three at least being members of the Academic Council of the College,	6
Elected by the Governing Body of University College, Cork, two at least being members of the Academic Council of the College,	4
Elected by the Governing Body of University College, Galway, two at least being members of the Academic Council of the College,	4
The Registrar,	1
Members of Convocation elected by Convocation of the University,	8
Co-opted,	4
In all,	35

The present Senate has had different meetings, and has elected the Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor, and the Pro-Vice-Chancellors. The Chancellor is His Grace the Most Reverend William Joseph Walsh, D. D., Catholic Archbishop of Dublin; the Vice-Chancellor is Sir Christopher Nixon, Bart., M. D., LL. D., a well known Dublin physician; and the Pro-Vice-Chancellors are the three Presidents of the constituent colleges, namely, Alexander Anderson, M. A., LL. D., President of University College, Galway; Denis Joseph Coffey, M. A., M. B., B. Ch., President of University College, Dublin; and Bertram Coghill Alan Windle, M. A., M. D., D. Sc., F. R.S., President of University College, Cork.

The Act of Parliament, together with those portions of the Charters, Statutes, and Report which illustrate it, has now been fairly exhaustively examined: it remains to consider the other sections of the latter documents.

(To be continued.)

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A CONTRIBUTION TO THE HISTORY OF RELIGION IN INDIA.

The Pariśiṣṭas of the Atharvaveda.

The present article is along the general lines of a lecture, deliverd by Dr. von Negelein on the 17th of August, 1908, before the International Congress of Orientalists, at Copenhagen, under the title, *Zur Religionsgeschichte Indiens: Die Atharvapariśiṣṭa*, and afterwards printed in the *Orientalische Literatur-Zeitung, Oktober, 1908, Sp. 447 ff.* The purpose of the lecture was to lay before the Congress our plans for the publication of the *editio princeps* of the Atharvan Pariśiṣṭas, and at the same time to call attention to the general features of the interest and importance of these texts for Indic Philology, and especially for the history of the development of religion in India. Since the delivery of this lecture, the first volume of the work has begun to appear,[1] and its completion will be delayed but little, if at all, beyond the appearance of this article. The time seems therefore appropriate for the publication in the *Bulletin* of a similar article, in order that it may serve as a statement to the authorities of the University, and to its friends, of part of the work that has been carried on in the Department of Sanskrit. This practical motive also renders it permissible to refer gratefully to the honors that have been shown to the work, the bestowal of the Bopp-Stipendium by the *Koeniglich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin*, and a liberal appropriation from the funds of the Hardy Foundation made by the *Koeniglich Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Muenchen* to aid in the continuance of the

[1] The Pariśiṣṭas of the Atharvaveda. *Edited by G. M. Bolling (Prof. of Greek and Associate Prof. of Comparative Philology and Sanskrit in the Catholic University of America) and J. von Negelein (Privatdoz. f. indogerman. Sprachen Asiens an der Universitaet Koenigsberg). Vol. I: Text and Critical Apparatus. Part I: Pariśiṣṭas I–XXXVI. Leipsic (Otto Harrassowitz) 1909. Pp. xxiv + 234 oct. Part II: Pariśiṣṭas XXXVII–LXXII. Leipsic (Otto Harrassowitz) 1910. Pp. 235–534. Part III: Indices,* is in press.

edition. It will be well to begin with an outline of the work previously done upon the Pariśiṣṭas.

The acquaintance of occidental scholars with these texts dates from the acquisition of the Chambers collection of manuscripts by the Royal Library at Berlin. Among these was a manuscript of the Pariśiṣṭas that early attracted the attention of the famous Berlin Sanskritist, Albrecht Weber. A complete copy of the manuscript was made by Weber between December, 1857, and February, 1858, and is now the property of the Library of Congress. Its use had been promised to me by Weber himself, but with the proviso that I should first establish the text independently of its aid. His death prevented my claiming from him the fulfillment of this promise, but the acquisition of his books and manuscripts, by the Library of Congress brought it about under the conditions that he had made, and we have good reason to be grateful to him for the assistance thus given us. Unfortunately the manuscript was too poor to serve alone as a basis for the publication of the entire text, but it was used by Weber in a variety of ways. Besides giving an account of the contents of the codex in his *Verzeichniss der Sanskrit-Handschriften der Koeniglichen Bibliothek zu Berlin, nos. 364–366*, Weber drew extensively upon the material containd in the first *Pariśiṣṭa*, the *Nakṣatrakalpa* for his famous monograph, *Die vedischen Nachrichten von den Nakṣatra (Mondstationen), Berlin, 1860–61;* gave a digest of the contents of part of the forty-sixth Pariśiṣṭa in his article, *Zur Textgeschichte der Vedasaṃhitās, insbesondere der Atharva-Saṃhitā, Indische Studien, iv, 431 ff.;* published and translated the greater part of the sixty-seventh Pariśiṣṭa in another monograph, *Zwei vedische Texte ueber Omina und Portenta, Berlin, 1859;* and finally edited an astrological text on 'the conflict of Planets,' the fifty-first Pariśiṣṭa, in *Indische Studien, x, 317 ff.*

The next scholar to interest himself deeply in these texts was Rudolf Meyer, who, according to a marginal note in the Chambers codex, used that manuscript between June and October of 1876. The fruits of his labors are to be found in many notes scattered through the introduction and commentary to his text of the *Ṛgvidhāna, Berlin, 1878.* An increase of the available manuscript material was brought about by Buehler's presentation to the

Royal Library at Berlin of an apographon of a Bombay Codex, and by Haug's having made at Baroda in 1863–4 a copy of another manuscript, which is now the property of the Royal Library at Munich. A detailed description of the first of these manuscripts was given by Weber in the second volume of his *Verzeichniss, no. 1497.*

A second period in the study of these texts was brought about by the work done upon them by Bloomfield, as part of the preparation for his edition of the Kauśika Sūtra which appeard in 1890. Besides the Berlin codices, Bloomfield obtained from the Bombay Government two most important manuscripts. On the basis of this material he was enabled not only to elucidate the one hundred and fortieth chapter of the Kauśika by comparing the corresponding nineteenth Pariśiṣṭa; and to state definitely what hymns the Kauśika means to employ in numerous passages where it mentions only the name of a list of hymns, the thirty-second Pariśiṣṭa being a statement of the hymns contained in each of these and other lists; but also to print, in *The Am. Journal of Philology,* VII, 188, pp. 485 ff., the text of a number of verses which are added as an appendix to the first Pariśiṣṭa with the statement that they come from the Paippalāda recension of the Atharvaveda, and to discuss, *Proc. American Oriental Society,* XV, 1890, 48–50, the forty-eighth Pariśiṣṭa, the Kautsavya Niruktanighaṇṭu, and its relation to the work of Yāska. Further than this, Bloomfield inspired and directed a number of his pupils in working upon these texts. So Hatfield undertook to settle the numbering of the texts, *PAOS.* XIV, 1888, pp. 156–161; Goodwin published, *The Skandayāga; text and translation, PAOS. xv., 1890, pp. 5–13;* Magoun, *The Āsurīkalpa, Johns Hopkins Diss., Am. Journal of Philology, x., 1889, pp. 165–197;* and Hatfield, *The Aušanasūdbhutāni. Text and translation, JAOS. xv., 1891, pp. 207–220;* the two last scholars also published briefer reports on their texts in *PAOS. XIV., 1888, pp. 13–17 and 12–13.* In addition is to be mentioned the extensive use of this source of information that has been made by Bloomfield in his *Hymns of the Atharvaveda, Sacred Books of the East, vol. XLII, Oxford, 1897,* and his account of the Atharvan literature, *The Atharvaveda, Strassburg, 1899.* Within this period are only two works, that do not go back directly to

Bloomfield, the publication and translation of the Śrāddhakalpa by Caland in his *Altindischer Ahnencult, Leiden, 1893*, and Siegling's use of the Caraṇavyūha in his dissertation, *Die Rezensionen des Caraṇavyūha, Berlin, 1906*.

The work that had been done up to this point was all fragmentary, nor could it claim to be final, because it was based upon only a portion of the available manuscript material. It served however, to show the value and importance of the work, and so no one doubted the soundness of Bloomfield's judgment, when in his *Atharvaveda, p. 19*, he claimd for these texts a degree of interest "that calls for a critical edition of the entire collection."

The impulse to the present edition proceeded, independently and about the same time, from each of the two scholars, whose names dominate the history of the preceding work. For in the year 1898 the task was suggested by Weber to von Negelein, and to myself by Bloomfield. Each of us accepted the suggestion, but proceeded to prepare for the execution of the task in different ways. Dr. von Negelein devoted himself first to preliminary studies in the history of religion and the thorough reading of the younger portions of the Veda, postponing until 1903 the attack upon the manuscripts themselves. On the other hand, I turned immediately to the manuscripts, visiting for that purpose during the summer of 1899 Berlin and Munich, and seeking to obtain through the kindness of my friend the late Dr. A. W. Stratton, Registrar of the Punjab University and Principal of the Oriental College at Lahore, additional material from India. In the spring of 1905 we learned of each other's work, and decided that it would be for the interest of Sanskrit studies for us to prosecute the work conjointly. Since my visit to Europe the death of Professor Roth had brought to the library of the University of Tuebingen his copy of the last half of a manuscript, now in India but inaccessible to us. Dr. von Negelein had used this manuscript, and had also procured from India another excellent manuscript of practically the entire text, besides fragments of two older manuscripts. This access of new material put at our disposal almost all of the manuscripts known to be in existence. The chief exception was a manuscript belonging to the Mahārāja of Alwār, besides which there was the first half of the manuscript which Roth had copied,

and an uncatalogued manuscript in either Jaipur or Alwār, of which Dr. Stratton had sent me a specimen. The manuscript material at our disposal revealed the fact that all the manuscripts were descended from a single manuscript written about five hundred years ago, which it was possible to reconstruct by their aid. Inquiries made by Dr. Stratton in Kashmir had shown that the Brahmans of that district possessed no manuscripts either of the entire collection or of single texts, and there was, therefore, every reason to conclude: (1) that the reconstruction of this archetype would be altered little, if at all, by the use of the manuscripts known to exist but inaccessible to us, and (2) that the chance of discovering a manuscript not descended from this archetype was exceedingly remote. In view of this it was clear that the text of this archetype must be the foundation for all further attempts at understanding the Pariśiṣṭas, and we determined to undertake its publication.

This archetype itself, however, proved to have been a very corrupt manuscript. A number of lacunae can be pointed out with absolute certainty, in at least one case an extensive passage has been wrongly repeated, in other passages it is clear that large portions of the text stand in the wrong position. Besides, running through the whole manuscript, is a carelessness in copying, now greater now less, and reaching its maximum in certain grammatical texts which have been reduced almost to a meaningless jumble of letters. For the control of this material we had a number of secondary aids. Quotations from our texts are scattered through Sāyaṇa's commentary to the Atharvaveda, Hemādri's voluminous encyclopaedia, the Caturvarga-cintāmaṇi, and Keśava's commentary to the Kauśika Sūtra. These we have gathered and employed; though their usefulness has been lessened by the fact that Keśava's work is known only from an exceedingly corrupt manuscript, while Sāyaṇa and Hemādri seem to have used manuscripts of the Pariśiṣṭas but little better than our archetype. Essentially better, however, were the extensive quotations from one of the grammatical texts, made by the commentator to the Prātiśākhya of the Atharvaveda. On the other hand, our texts had drawn to a considerable extent on the older Vedic literature, and the identification of such passages gave us another means of

control. Finally there were the closer or more remote parallels to be found especially in the Bṛhat Saṃhitā, and the quotations from the older astrological literature made by its commentator. But such aids are at the best poor substitutes for a good manuscript tradition.

In addition to these difficulties, there were others that lie in the nature of the texts themselves. The ground covered by them includes detailed descriptions of the ritual, as well as grammatical, and lexical matters, the history of literature, and the wide fields of astronomy and astrology. The work is a collection of texts of various styles and dates. To a great extent the separate texts are themselves compilations made with varying degrees of skill from various sources. Successive processes of expansion have been brought to bear both upon the collection as a whole, and also upon some of its parts. The result is an intricate series of problems of higher criticism, which cannot at all points be easily distinguished from those of the lower criticism. Corresponding to this is an equal diversity of style and language. There is a certain amount of old hymn-material, to some extent new to some extent known from other sources, there is also a certain number of verses composed in imitation of such materials. Besides this, there are passages in good Brahmanical prose, and others in the peculiarly condensed style of the sūtras. The bulk of the material however is composed in *ślokas*, the metrical technique of which would alone be sufficient evidence of their originating at different periods; and we find besides various of the elaborate meters of the classic period. In short every stratum of Sanskrit from the earliest Vedic to the classic is more or less fully represented.

Such a mass of material is to be expected to bring to light facts of interest for the history of the language. Dr. von Negelein estimates that our *Index Verborum* will refer to about twelve thousand passages, and contain hundreds of words that will give occasion for comment; words that are new or rare, words said by grammarians to be in use, or to be used in a particular meaning, but which have hitherto not been found in the literature, or at least not in the meaning alleged. Besides there are to be recorded deviations from ordinary morphology and syntax. In part these

are no doubt mere blunders of the scribes, but in part they are also indications of a freer handling of the language by the authors than the law of Pāṇini's grammar would admit. To distinguish between the two cases has proved a problem that has increased the difficulties of the editors' task.

In view of these manifold difficulties, it is of course evident that a perfect text of the Pariśiṣṭas is at present unattainable. There are a number of passages in which the manuscript tradition simply breaks down, and we are confronted with a senseless jumble of words or letters. For such passages, except where they are known from other sources, even an approximation to the original text is impossible, and we have been compelled to print the reading of the manuscripts with the additions in the commentary of more or less certain indications of their correction, or at least of the direction in which this correction is to be sought. The plan of the work has compelled us to make such suggestions in the briefest possible form, as it is our intention to return to these passages with more detail in a subsequent volume. On the other hand, there are pages and pages of the text that are either entirely satisfactory, or are in such a condition that their general meaning can be accurately determined. In view of the interest and important bearings of the facts that can thus be ascertained, and the remoteness of the possibility of ever obtaining better manuscripts, the advantage of publishing these texts seemed to us clearly to outweigh the unavoidable imperfections. It is a pleasure to note, that such is also the opinion of Oldenberg, expressed in a review of our work, *Deutsche Literaturzeitung, 1909, Sp. 2070 f.*

I have already spoken of the gain for the history of language to be made from these texts, in the next place is to be mentioned the light that they throw back upon the preceding monuments of Vedic literature. Our concordance to the *mantra*-material found in the Pariśiṣṭas covers twenty-four double-column pages. In it are comprised about four hundred rubrications of Atharvan hymns and verses. This means a corresponding increase of our knowledge of the way these hymns were employed in the ritual, and such knowledge has proved in the past the surest key for the interpretation of the hymns. The case of AV 4. 9. 1 may be cited as an illustration: the hymn is a glorification of some salve

as a protector of life and limb. Bloomfield renders the first verse: "Come hither! Thou art the living, protecting eye-ointment of the mountain, given by all the gods as a safeguard unto life." But, the word translated as 'eye-ointment' does not occur elsewhere, there are variants in the manuscripts, and the commentator gives a different interpretation. Emendations have been suggested, and objections have been made to the idea of eye-ointment as too narrow for this context. Our texts now clinch the interpretation of the passage by saying that the king's chaplain recites the verses while putting ointment upon the king's eyes. Over and above such gains, is the fact, that the Pariśiṣṭas are in themselves important documents for the history of the development of Indian civilization, because they give an outline of the whole religious life of the later Vedic period from the point of view of the Atharvan priest. To what an extent this is true, may be seen from the following sketch of the contents of the collection, and of their bearing upon some of the wider problems of Indic Philology.

As early as the times of the Brāhmaṇas we find mention of twenty-seven (afterwards twenty-eight) stars or constellations, called *Nakṣatras*, lying near the elliptic, and embracing the whole circuit of the heavens in such a way as to constitute a sort of lunar zodiac. This system has always been of special interest to students of Indian antiquities both because of the prominent rôle that it plays in Indian religion and astrology, and also because of the problems connected with its origin and date. As is well known, the Chinese and Arabs both have systems so similar that it is impossible to believe that they originated separately. The invention has been claimed for each of these three nations and also for Babylon; and, in spite of the lively controversy on the subject between Weber, Biot, and Whitney, the question still remains *sub judice*. Repeated efforts have also been made from the time of Colebrook to the most recent years to find in the Vedic statements about the *Nakṣatras* astronomical data that will furnish proof of the time at which the system originated, and so determine the date of the texts that report it. Like the question of origin, this also is a question which it has as yet been impossible to solve. Now, the first of the Pariśiṣṭas, the *Nakṣatrakalpa*, is the earliest systematic account of this lunar zodiac that has been

preserved. The text is ritualistic rather than astronomical, so that its value will be for the first, rather than for the last two problems mentioned. At the same time it will show well the theoretical, conventional treatment of the system in India at an early period, which is a factor that enters into the solution of the question of the origin of the system.

In another way also the text is of especial interest. In each Veda there are different schools. The differences between them may consist merely in details of the performance of the ritual, or may extend to the possession of varying recensions (*śākhās*, 'branches') of the collections of hymns in use. The published text of the Atharvaveda is that of the Śaunakīya school, but there has been preserved besides in a single corrupt birchbark manuscript the text of the Paippalāda school. This manuscript was discovered in Kashmir, and brought to the University of Tuebingen through the instrumentality of Professor Roth. A photographic reproduction, published by Bloomfield and Garbe, has recently rendered it generally accessible, and it is now one of the chief centers of interest for Atharvanic studies. Of the ancillary literature of the Atharva a few Upaniṣads are said to belong to the Paippalāda school, and the same claim has been made by Caland, with a good deal of improbability, for the Gopatha Brāhmaṇa. In the Nakṣatrakalpa however, we have for the first time, a ritualistic Paippalāda text. The recognition of this fact also does away with what was supposed to be definite proof, that the nineteenth book of the Śaunakīya Saṃhitā was not added to that collection until after the composition of the Nakṣatrakalpa. Incidentally may also be mentioned the fact, that the Pariśiṣṭas are the best source for our knowledge of the Atharvan schools.

One of the most important figures in Hindū life was the house chaplain of the king (*purohita*, *guru*, *brahman*); in spiritual matters he was the king's representative, and upon his skill in the performance of his magic-religious duties depended the temporal welfare of both king and people. We have frequent incidental mention of this officer of the king's household from the very beginning of Vedic literature on; but, for a connected picture of his qualifications, his duties, and his rewards, there is no better source of information than the following group of Pariśiṣṭas.

The first text, within this group shows us the eagerness with which this office of power behind the throne was sought, and introduces us to a lively theological polemic. For the claim is advanced, in no uncertain tone, that this office must be given to an Atharvan priest, and vivid pictures are drawn of the misfortunes that follow upon the appointment of an adherent of one of the other three Vedas. With such a *guru* the king is like a lame man upon a road, a wingless bird in the sky, or a swimmer with a stone about his neck. The squabbling goes even farther, and it is claimed, that only priests of certain schools of the Atharva are eligible for the office. Incidental statements in non-Atharvanic texts go to show that the Atharvans were successful, at least to a considerable extent, in pressing these claims.

Our texts then proceed to deal with the duties of the *purohita* in his relation to the king. In this connection, they describe the ceremony of coronation, an elaborate lustration performed each month when the moon is in conjunction with the Nakṣatra Puṣya, and, what is more interesting, the ceremonies performed each day, when the king rises, or retires. The obligations are however mutual, and our texts next treat at length of the king's bestowal upon the *purohita* of various benefactions. These include the giving of an image of a cow made of sesame, for which may be substituted an image made of the most precious substances; the presentation of the king's weight in gold; the bestowal of a cake representing the sun, or of an image of the earth made of gold and decked with silver and jewels to represent the mountains, waters, and trees; also the gifts of a horse-chariot, of an elephant-chariot, of a thousand cows. Little details show the priests grasping at petty possibilities of enhancing the value of the gift. The cow must have its calf, and even its milking pail; the king must be weighed in full armor and with all his regalia. On the other hand the obligation to give is regularly limited by the giver's ability to give—a rule which may be interpreted either as willingness to take the proverbial half loaf, or as the manifestation of a nobler ethical idea. Each of these benefactions however, is itself an elaborate ceremony, otherwise the gift is vain; and as such, they entail expensive fees to the priest. The section is brought to a close by a calendar of the ceremonies which he king is to have performed throughout the year.

After the description of four ceremonies, of which two are new and two expansions of the ritual of the Kauśika, our texts proceed to treat of the whole ceremonial apparatus. Here every detail is of importance, because it may either insure the success of the sacrifice, or may encompass the destruction of sacrificer and priest. We have therefore minute rules for the selection of the place of sacrifice, for the erection and adornment of temple and altar, for the construction of the fire-pit, for the apparatus with which the fire is produced by friction, for the fuel that is employed, for the observance of ominous appearances of the fire, for the substances that are to be sacrificed, given to the priests, or employed in other ways, for the vessels and spoons to be used, and for the manipulation of the hand, when the offering is made without a spoon. Nowhere else are these matters treated with such fulness; and the texts are of especial interest, because they not only throw light back upon the earlier ritual, but also because they exhibit new phases in its development.

Next follow a group of ceremonies for the obtainment of special wishes, the efficacy of which depends chiefly upon the number of times (ranging from 10,000 to 10,000,000) that the oblation is repeated. As the recitation of certain *gaṇas*, lists of hymns, is ordained in the last of these sacrifices, the following Pariśiṣṭa, the Gaṇamālā, is devoted to the definition of these terms, and is thus of great importance for the interpretation of the Atharvan ritual.

The following texts bring us into the sphere of witchcraft. The first of these, the Ghṛtakambala is intended to defend the sacrificer against the attacks of various demons and against sorcery. The other texts are aggressive and exceedingly interesting. One shows the worldwide practice, which however is not often attested for Vedic magic, of reciting a prayer backwards in order to work evil. The two remaining texts record a number of uncanny practices with the mustard-plant and in honor of certain forms of Rudra-Śiva in order to secure manifold, but chiefly nefarious, ends.

Besides the position of house chaplain to the king, the Atharvan priests laid claim to another lucrative office. The greater Vedic ceremonies required the coöperation of three classes of priests, the adherents of the Rig, the Sāma, and the Yajur Veda,

who respectively recite the sacred texts, sing the holy chants, and perform the manual labor of the sacrifice. This holy work is however fraught with danger; as an error, whether accidental or intentional, (the texts more or less openly teach how the priests may bring about the death of their patron) may lead to destruction. To guard against such possibilities there was need of a fourth priest, the Brahman to supervise the whole ceremony, and whose duty it was to expiate any error that might be made. The Atharvans claimed that this office must be held by an Atharvan priest, and that their Veda was the universal knowledge, of which the Vedas of the other priests were but a fraction. The Kauśika devotes a chapter to the imparting of instructions as to how to fulfill this duty, and the topic is next developed in our text along lines that are only partially parallel.

Two small texts that follow, the ritual of a purificatory ceremony and of a ceremony for the consecration of various pools in order to render them suitable places for ceremonial baths, seem to have their point of contact in the use of the *pañcagavya* 'the five products of the cow,' a mixture preeminently holy in the eyes of the Hindū down to the present day, but which here makes its appearance for the first time in the Atharvan ritual. The following text deals with the performance of a vow in honor of Rudra under the form Paśupati. Its most salient feature is the bathing in the ashes of a fire in which certain oblations have been made. The texts treat next of the performance of certain daily duties, the twilight worship, the bath, and the accompanying offering of water to the spirits of the departed ancestors. The last naturally leads to the description of the *śrāddha*-ritual, the ceremony of feeding these ancestors. The ritual texts are closed by the description of the *Agnihotra*-sacrifice, and the rules for certain vows.

The following section comprises three texts, of which the first describes the alphabet presupposed, but not described, in the Atharvan textbook on phonetics. The second is lexical, containing groups of synonymous and obscure words. The work was one originally compiled with reference chiefly to the Rig Veda, and the Atharvans have done little to adapt it to their own particular needs. They have however, preserved it in a form

different from both of the recensions previously known, although owing to the corruption of the manuscripts it is unfortunately impossible to estimate accurately the degree of variation. More independent is the 'account of the Vedic schools' as compared with the Rig and Yajur recensions of the work. Noticeable in it is the description of the Vedas as men, which seems to imply pictorial or plastic representations of them, for which this text is the earliest evidence.

The remainder of the collection (about two-fifths of the whole) is a compendium of natural astrology, that is of the interpretation as portents of any abnormal phenomena that may be observed on earth, in the atmosphere, or in the heavens. Our knowledge of this sort of astrology is at present based primarily upon a work composed in the sixth century of our era by the great astronomer Varāha Mihira. His work, the Bṛhat Saṃhitā, is an encyclopedia of this pseudo-science, that sums up the facts supposed to have been established in the course of its development from the earliest period. Varāha Mihira refers to the opinions of numerous predecessors, but our sources of information about their work have hitherto been exceedingly meager. Only one work, the Vṛddha Garga Saṃhitā, is known to have been preserved, and the manuscripts of it are said to be unusually corrupt. The other works are known only through quotations made by Bhaṭṭotpala in his commentary to the Bṛhat Saṃhitā. In our texts we have published for the first time one of the sources upon which Varāha Mihira drew directly or indirectly. Both the coincidences with, and the variations from Bhaṭṭotpala's quotations are striking, and will raise interesting questions. Our texts produce the impression of greater antiquity, than do the works from which Bhaṭṭotpala quotes. It is quite probable that this is actually the case, though it is also possible that the appearance of antiquity is due to the fact that the compilers of our collection have selected merely the less technical parts of these works. In either case these Pariśiṣṭas seem likely to remain the best contemporary evidence for the earlier period of the development of astrology in India.

In conclusion I will speak briefly of the further work that we have planned, and to a considerable extent begun. Our first effort will be to gather and digest the metrical, grammatical, and

lexical facts presented by these texts. In the next place we shall bring together as completely as possible the available evidence that throws light upon the subject matter of the Pariśiṣṭas. As much of this evidence is found in still unedited manuscripts, this will involve the publication of a number of texts, among which will be included the Vṛddha Garga Saṃhitā. This portion of the work will constitute a volume of about six hundred pages, which we hope to be able to print without great delay. The final volume of the work will consist of a translation and a commentary explaining our constitution and interpretation of the text. A practical difficulty that will confront us, will be the securing of the funds necessary to defray the costs of publication. The work, in spite of its importance, appeals necessarily to a very limited audience, and there is not the slightest possibility of the returns from its sale equaling the cost of publication. After ten years of labor we were compelled to begin the printing of the first volume at our own risk. From the certainty of loss we were rescued first by the generosity of Rt. Rev. Bishop Dennis J. O'Connell, then Rector of the University, who contributed from his own means the sum of five hundred dollars towards defraying the cost of publication, and afterwards by the liberality of the German Academies as already mentioned. From none of these sources have we any right to expect further assistance, but we do hope that the merits of the work will appeal to the liberality of those who believe in the importance to mankind of the study of the history of religion.

George Melville Bolling.

REALITY FROM THE SPECTATOR'S STANDPOINT.[1]

It is a long time since Aristotle said that the discussion of the *existence* of a thing should precede the discussion of its *nature*. Had the wisdom of this remark not been lost on recent framers of theories of knowledge, a situation, sufficiently complicated in itself already, would not have been made more so by the joint treatment of two distinct issues, such as reality and the nature of reality, the existence of real knowledge and the validity of the same. It is usual to find both these questions treated together by idealists and pragmatists alike, and the result, as might be expected, is confusion worse confounded. If the pragmatist, or the idealist, as the case may be, consented to refrain from theorizing long enough, at least, to give the earliest stages of human consciousness the distinct attention they deserve, he would not find himself from the outset so hopelessly imprisoned in the subjective, like a squirrel revolving in a cage. Unfortunately this is not the circumspect way in which the problem of human knowledge and the nature of its deliverances is approached.

The contemporary philosopher approaches this problem for the most part with a prejudice, which he either inherits from the idealists of the past, or acquires from the psychologists and men of science of the present. This prejudice is the doctrine, that we are directly conscious only of ourselves, and foredoomed to an inner circle of experience. The whole question of the existence of reality is thus begged at the very outset, prejudged in the light of an unproven axiom, instead of being allowed the benefit of its own lights, however dim. The *conscious* fact of the direct perception of real objects is wrongly made subordinate to the *unconscious* fact that there are mediating processes going on between the perceived object and

[1] See *Catholic University Bulletin*, December, 1909, January, 1910, for introductory articles: "The Disappearance of Reality in Modern Philosophy." "The Further Disappearance of Reality in Modern Philosophy."

the perceiving subject. Theories of physics, physiology, and biology are thus enlisted to deny the direct, primary testimony of consciousness, and we have nothing to start with, or in some cases, to end with, but a "brain-event" within us. A distinct treatment of reality and the nature of reality would save us here at the start from confounding knowledge with explanation.

Knowledge Versus Explanation.

The worship of explanation has been called the superstition of modern philosophy. At first sight the charge seems undeserved. But when we reflect that the province of knowledge is much wider than the domain of explanation, that we do know more than we can define, represent, reproduce, or explain, and that knowledge and classified knowledge differ as the stars, if not in glory, at least in magnitude, we begin to realize that there is a fair-sized grain of truth in the accusation after all.[2] Men are altogether too prone in these days of grace to attach destructive importance to the question, How did it happen? and to use the manner of a thing's happening, real or assumed, against its having happened at all. An instance may be seen in the case to hand. Knowledge is rejected, because nothing short of explanation will be accepted. The question, How, takes undue precedence over a question of fact, and is used to neutralize or destroy whatever evidence has been presented in favor of the latter. We are said not to reach the object immediately, all because we cannot account for the manner of our so doing, or because the difficulties which science presents are deemed all but inescapable. The primary deliverances of our knowledge with regard to objects are thus set aside as illusions, and the chief reason for this premature rejection of evidence

[2] Knowledge is a fact quite independent of any and all theories advanced to explain it. For instance, we cannot *represent* first principles, or the categories of mind, substance, quality, relation, cause, effect, etc., and yet we know (in the sense of apprehending) them. Knowledge is not therefore essentially a mere representation, or copy. This apprehensive side of knowledge must not be submerged in the constructive, but given the distinct recognition it deserves as a primary, indubitable fact of consciousness.

is to be found in the desire to begin philosophy with an explanation rather than with the recognition of what actually occurs, explain it as we will, theorize about it as we may.

The radical fault is not in theoretical idealism as such, nor the cure in an idealism that is practical. The trouble is not in the adjectives, but in the noun. There is a constant cry in the literature of the day for "concrete" thinking, due for the most part, no doubt, to the excesses of rational idealists in the opposite direction. It is a pity that this latest phase of idealistic reform should have contented itself with lopping off the luxuriant growth of the topmost branches of the tree, instead of laying the axe to the root. The reform, to be genuine and truly practical, should strike at the vice which is inherent in the idealistic method itself, whatever form the latter may take, theoretical or practical. Then we would at last have rid ourselves of such extremities of doctrine as that all the items of experience are plastic and malleable, that we make the world we live in, and that the universe is only the small world of human experience "spinning forever down the ringing grooves of change." When men professing to be practical reformers are driven into such cobweb corners as these for refuge, there must indeed be something more in heaven and earth than is dreamt of in their philosophy. It is hard to see how all this assuages one's thirst for the practical, unless it be, as in the case of so-called "Christian Science," that one is cured by suggestion, whether he swallows the metaphysics or not. But it is the something more in heaven and earth that constrains us.

> "Oh the little more and how much it is!
> And the little less, and what worlds away!"

If history has proven anything, it has shown the thirst of man for abiding reality, and the futility of all his learned attempts to reach it through a subjective mirage; and if it counsels anything, it is to take the first step in a philosophical journey warily. *C'est le premier pas qui coûte.*

> "Principiis obsta; sero medicina paratur
> Cum mala per longas invaluere moras."

Spectator and Participant.

Before taking this first step, it might be profitable, even if not edifying, to see ourselves for a moment as others see us. It is decidedly out of fashion to-day to revive in philosophy the supposedly moribund point of view of the 'disinterested spectator,' who still believes in knowledge, virtue, truth, and action, each for its own sake, regardless of how his personal profits or interests may be affected thereby. It is the producer's point of view which has secured the ascendant in these intensely practical, sentimental times. We might as well then recognize the shabby clothes in which we are appearing; also that, while pragmatists are averse to having any of our kind about, still novelty and fashion are not yet the accepted standards of truth with all thoughtful mortals. Philosophy, so the pragmatists would have us believe, is combative, not contemplative. A disinterested spectator is therefore a sort of armed non-combatant, and none of us need to be told the fate in store for free-lances during times of war. Life, the new empiricists urge, is a battlefield, not a game; men are doers, not mere lookers-on; active participants, not idling spectators; action is the watchword of the hour, if not of the eternities themselves.

It is always a little hard to get hold of a metaphor. The picture in it is not easily detached from the frame, and there is always the danger of ruining it in the process of detachment. But, without spoiling the picture, one might retort, in continuation of the same figure of speech, that generals usually "watch the game" while their subalterns are fighting the battle. Was it not the confederate chieftain, Lee, who said that a general should do all his thinking before a battle, and none during it? Not that we wish in thus retorting to pose as generals, and so escape the burden of soldiering, but simply to make clear that the two offices of spectator and participant are interchangeable, and become incompatible only when the glamor of a false contrast is thrown about them, as seems to happen every time a pragmatist manipulates these taking phrases. The respective

points of view of spectator and producer easily run into one another, interpenetrate, so to speak, and merge. It may be, and no doubt is, a convenience to distinguish these two standpoints and to treat them distinctly; but, to separate them, and thus turn them into mutually exclusive opposites is nothing short of a crime. It is only in giving both points of view their proper recognition, only in insisting on both together, and neither apart, that we may hope to keep our own balance and that of the world into the bargain. We propose therefore in what follows to consider ourselves as observers, to occupy the spectator's standpoint long enough, at least, to look before we leap. It is a good thing to anticipate our own prejudices, and to let the world speak for itself, before we begin to inform it of its own character. The later judgments which we form concerning the nature of things should not be promiscuously confused with the earlier judgments which have in view the fact of existence solely.

Knowledge as Simple Apprehension.

It has been the fashion, since Kant's time, to regard knowledge as starting with an act of judgment. This way of approaching the problem, in addition to being decidedly unfair to that portion of experience which precedes the exercise of acts of judgment on our part, also involves the serious mistake in tactics of allowing theories of explanation to figure on the same solid footing as actually experienced elements of fact. It not infrequently happens, in consequence of this faulty method of procedure, that a theory of the facts is used to neutralize the effects of the evidence presented. We would do well therefore not to perpetuate in our own person the current habit of confusing the original simplicity of thought with its subsequent complexity. The real point of departure is not complex. A false start is therefore to be avoided, as is also the mistake of reading simple facts in the light of some preconceived notion, which we may chance to entertain regarding the respective functions which sense and reason discharge in the acquisition of human knowledge.

Let us begin by studying knowledge in its incipient stage, in that first act, called simple apprehension, by which an object is understood, grasped, or brought before the mind. To keep the subject under investigation free from all assumptions, let there be no thought of Kant's doctrine, that apprehension is a synthetic act, whereby the mind invests with a temporal and spatial form the shapeless things that come before it to be thus clothed, listed, and labelled. The evidence should be weighed, not prejudged; we should study the beginnings of knowledge with our eyes, not with our prejudices. There is something to be learned, even by philosophers, it would seem, from the procedure of courts of justice, where hearings are granted before decisions are announced.

This earliest moment of our knowing, when reality, as it were, comes streaming in through the windows of consciousness, is the best for catching knowledge in its purity. In the exercise of the simple act of apprehension, the mind is filled with the presence of the object—desk, chair, table, tree, or what not else, which floods the line of vision; the critic in us is asleep, the spectator vigilant; we are wholly for the nonce preoccupied with that kind of knowledge which Tennyson describes as "of things we see," which Aristotle was fond of calling "direct contact" with truth, and which with many of a later day has gone by the name of "intuition." Concrete objects alone are before us, and we bask in the sunshine of their presence, blissfully unaware, for the time being, that even these luminous suns have their spots, to mar for us the perfection of their light by the dark holes, visible to more accurate observation, in their photosphere. Something is being really manifested to us; we are undergoing knowledge, and not manufacturing it.

In this first perceptive moment there is as yet no *clear* consciousness of the duality of the datum presented, of the distinction between perceiver and perceived which lurks in it, or of the external reference, which, like an index finger, points back to the object from even the most arid and remote deserts of speculation; no consciousness of anything, in fact, but the

datum, the object, the presentation itself. The object presents itself as a total, undistinguished mass, containing, it is true, many features and much food for subsequent reflection, which in this very first moment of perception remain hidden. We are conscious of a mass, but as yet we make no attempt to itemize the account of what we are experiencing, or to go into details in its regard. There is no analysis, comparison, reference, judgment, or any other complex operation going on; nothing but the simple act of knowing, which the poverty of human speech compels us to describe in the physical metaphor of "grasping" an object.

It is only later that these other and complex operations of detailing the account of the datum supervene, when the spectator's attitude yields in succession to that of the analyst, judge, critic, and referee, in a continuity of effort and of function, which all psychology, mediaeval as well as modern, forbids us to break or ignore with our formalistic attempts to divide the indivisible, to turn the human mind into a department store of separately arranged floors for the exhibition of different kinds of goods. In the first perceptive moment then, reality is indeed dumb, and it is we who speak for it. We have no quarrel with this statement of Professor James, if it mean no more than that the work of reason and of sense may be distinguished in the act of perception, so that what is dumb to sense is eloquent to intelligence; but when this distinction is made to mean that sense and reason work separately, reason furnishing beforehand "ideal frames" as receptacless for the sensations we experience, then we have a serious quarrel with the statement, both as coming originally from Kant, and as cropping out unexpectedly in one who professes to follow the straight and narrow path of a philosophy of "pure" experience

The badges of idealist, pragmatist, or even realist, are not worn when we stand at this open portal of knowledge; it is too early to classify either the object perceived, or the subject perceiving it. There is not the least suspicion yet engendered that our ideas are the substituted presence within us of a world of objects; nay, such a suspicion is conspicuous by its absence,

and arises only when we approach the facts with the *representative theory* of knowledge in mind, which is pretty much what everybody does, only to come face to face immediately with impending difficulty, if not complete disaster. At the threshold of knowledge the plain man and the philosopher act and serve together without distinction in receiving a guest, who seems content to let others find out for themselves who and what he is, and shows an amazing indifference to rebuff and criticism, if we may judge from the fact of his persistent reappearance in circles where he is not wanted, and even after he has been plainly told by the majority of philosophers that his room is preferred to his company.

Sense and Reason.

It is a fact of psychology, open to anybody's inspection, that our first experience is of objects, not of our sensations in their regard. The primary disclosure of consciousness is that an object exists, not that a sensation has been experienced; when we perceive, we recognize an object, we do not recognize a perception; in other words, "the results of perception are not the knowledge of its processes; the thing seen is not the knowledge of the mechanism of vision." [3] Saint Thomas expresses the same truth with a touch of actuality which makes his words doubly worth quoting: "Some have held," he says, "that sense knows merely its own subjective, organic reaction, but this view is manifestly false; the reaction is a secondary matter for knowledge; what is first known, therefore, is a thing." [4] Whatever be the means of communication which the senses have with the object, it is the latter alone which appears directly and immediately in consciousness. This fact of the direct appearance of the object in consciousness is most significant; it means that the object is known prior to the knowing of the image; it means that presentation, not representation, is the true character of

[3] "Essays Philosophical and Psychological." Perception and Epistomology. F. J. E. Woodridge, p. 164.

[4] Sum. Theol., 1 a, q. 85, a. 2.

human knowledge; it means that the theory of immediate perception is here in exclusive possession of the facts, and that all other theories have to show title and prove claims.

This testimony of consciousness to the existence of objects is looked upon askance by some, by others regarded as the only reliable account we have of the world of things. The idealist lets loose the whole pack of his favorite assumptions in full cry after it, instead of holding them tightly under leash, until the quarry has at least had a fair start and equal chances for its life. Theories of the nature of the object, of the nature of consciousness, and of the respective division of labor between sense and reason in the work of perception, are prematurely brought into play, either to minimize the evidence unduly, or to make of it the end, no less than the beginning, of human knowledge. Among those who take the latter attitude, for instance, is Professor James,[5] who denies the very existence of consciousness. The notion of consciousness is for him no more than a ghost, whose spectral presence is due to the subsequent 'overhauling' of experience.

Professor James tries to see a whole world of meaning, if not the whole meaning of the world, in the simple fact, that image and object are not simultaneously present in consciousness. The contrast between the retiring character of the "image," which keeps modestly in the background, and the brazen effrontery of the "object," which thrusts itself forward so conspicuously on our attention, is interpreted to mean the complete self-effacement of consciousness in the presence of reality. The business of the "idea," he argues, is to bring us face to face with the "object," and to eliminate itself in so doing. The idea is therefore a function of the *object,* which is trying by this means to get itself known, not a function of any *subject* trying to know an object. The idea is thus made to appear as an *instrument,* and ceases to be a representation, of reality. Two distinct things at the start, "image" and "object" eventually *fuse* their differences and become numerically one. Consciousness is

[5] *Journ. of Philos.*, vol. 1, No. 18, September 1, 1904. "Does Consciousness exist?" pp. 477–491.

therefore not a distinct entity, but a mere function, according to this relational theory, which admits nothing permanent anywhere, and banishes even the human self as an unsubstantial wraith into the shadows. In its stead Professor James substitutes a lot of minute little "egos" of momentary duration, which disappear reciting their "Morituri Te Salutamus,"

> "We are but as the blast,
> A moment heard, and then forever past."

Now, this mannikin theory of successively experienced selves is plainly at variance with the fundamental fact of modern psychology, that consciousness is concretely one and continuous. Accordingly, Professor James asks us first to break up this unity and continuity of consciousness into a number of fragments, such as are these divided, tiny selves, and then to join him in the work of rescuing the fragmentary "egos" from the isolation, in which his method placed him. No one, more than Professor James, has decried the practice of just such "mental anatomy" as this, and he must be in dire straits when he resorts to it himself, creating an artificial dismemberment of consciousness, and "gluing things together" again by means of a metaphor. The metaphor which he employs for this purpose is the suggestive one of inheritance, ownership, and conveyance, taken from social life, and transferred to things of the mind. Each "ego," we are asked to believe, hands on to its successor, unimpaired, all the experience it has acquired. The one, continuous knower is thus made to disappear, and any number of successive Owners of experience are created to take his place. The idealists make the subject swallow the object. Professor James makes the object devour the subject. In both instances, the will of the investigator is allowed to force his intellect to judge the evidence *too soon*. The result is that experience is detached from the experiencing subjects, and turned into "a stream." It is to such a pass as this that the philosophy of "just enough admissions to get along" leads the champions of Relativity.

The whole argument of Professor James amounts to little more, when sifted, than a pitting of the earlier stages of human

knowledge against the later, and proceeds on the tacit assumption, that sense and reason furnish two distinct, independent, contradictory accounts of reality, between which we have necessarily to choose, as between a true and a "doctored" report. His choice naturally leans to the sense-account as the only true one to be had for the seeking. The insidious half-truth back of this entire contention is an undisputed fact; namely—that sense does not explicitly reveal the notion of subject as distinct from that of object. The inference drawn from this partial truth is that experience is "pure," and consciousness therefore "a function," not an entity. "This entity is fictitious," he goes on to say, "while thoughts in the concrete are fully real, ... made of the same stuff as things are." [6] Without entering here into the general discussion which this theory of the nature of consciousness raises, it is sufficient for our present purpose to point out in passing that the facts of the matter, when fully stated and analyzed, lend themselves to no such view. Reflection discovers in the original sense-presentation the notion of subject implicitly contained there, concerning which sense is silent. The whole question therefore is whether sense can be made its own interpreter or not; whether, after all, it is, or is not, the same original report which is being continuously submitted to further examination. All that Professor James does is to cut the continuity between sense and intelligence, to stop the process of knowledge just when it was beginning to get under way. This comes perilously close to committing the same fault in the interest of sense, which he accuses others of doing in the interest of intelligence, that, namely, of dissecting a living process, as if it were already a corpse.

Professor James and his school are opposed to what they call the post-mortem examination of human experience by the reasoning faculty. Vivisection is all that they will allow. "Images" record and retain the very life of reality, we are told, whereas "concepts" are dead, inert, static, fleshless abstractions. This deadly contrast is true only on the false as-

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 491.

sumption, that concepts represent a final and fixed stage of knowledge, when in reality they are only its tentative beginnings. The new philosophy would rather have us "sense" reality than reason about it, and with this position few will withhold sympathy or pick a quarrel. But reason and reasoning are birds of quite different feather. The intuitive reason discovers, it does not discourse, after the fashion of abstract reason, and it is wrong to bracket the two together and send them both to the gallows for offences committed only by one. We hope in a future study to have the case of one of these "convicts" retried and reversed on the ground of "new evidence."

The new philosophy also would have it that sense should compenetrate intelligence, and send life pulsating through the latter's veins. But suppose that the reverse were true, as it was in the old philosophy of the schoolmen, before Immanuel Kant tried to wrestle with David Hume to his own destruction; suppose that intelligence compenetrates sense so thoroughly that the two meet, as air meets air, as water meets water, what becomes then of the attempt to construct a philosophy of pure experience? Does not the whole question dwindle at once to the theoretical inquiry, Which of these two conceptions of the relationship between sense and reason is necessitated by the facts? It is no part of the function of sense to reveal explicitly the existence or nature of the perceiving subject. Consequently, any argument drawn from the silence which sense preserves concerning the constitution either of our own selves, or the world, is deprived of all force.

We have no direct insight into the nature of anything,[7] even that of our own mind, and it is altogether too crude to suppose that we are equipped with a special mental apparatus for photographing the essences of things other than ourselves. Knowledge does not come to us ready-made in any such fashion, and hence Professor James is wrong in concluding, on the

[7] "Naturas sensibilium qualitatum cognoscere non est sensus sed intellectus." S. Thomas, "Sum. Theol.," 1 a, q. 78, a. 3, c. Turner, *History of Philosophy*, p. 355.

basis of the sense-reports alone, that the world is a topsey-turveydom of eccentric realities, and experience only a flowing stream. These questions of interpretation are altogether distinct from the simple fact of presentation, with which alone we are confronted in perception. All judgments concerning the nature of the universe, whether it is an accident, or a plan, a unity or a plurality, and all judgments concerning consciousness, whether it is an entity, or merely the shadow cast by our own knowing-processes, are decidedly out of place at this early stage of knowledge. These questions cannot be prematurely decided by an appeal to the "brute facts" of sensation, before reason—intuitive reason—has had a chance to examine the datum and sift it thoroughly. It is too early to start building a pluralistic universe, as Professor James does, out of the supposed chaos of human sensations, out of the supposed self-effacement of the subject in presence of the object. No wonder the world appears irrational when thus regarded from an irrational point of view. Cardinal Newman speaks somewhere of the ludicrous effect produced by a party of dancers upon one of those present, who happened to think of stopping his ears to the music while still continuing to gaze upon the scene. We may view the universe and ourselves from a hundred standpoints, but the question always remains, whether the point of view chosen is exhaustive, or even fair. It is not hard to see that in the present instance the viewpoint has neither of these two qualities. Since when was it proven that intelligence acts after sense, and not with and through it? Or, that the former brings in a prejudiced report of its own, regardless of the report furnished by the latter? Correction of this misconception of reason would have been of far more avail than the perpetuation of it as the corner-stone of a new philosophy.

> "Be not the first by whom the new are try'd,
> Nor yet the last to lay the old aside."

Knowledge its own Evidence.

It must be confessed, by any one acquainted with the history of modern philosophy, that the source of all the vexation of spirit experienced in framing a satisfactory theory of knowledge is in not acknowledging flatly from the start the utterly simple, irreducible, character of the first act or state of consciousness; and philosophy will have gained a point when this fact of irreducibility is recognized. The first conscious result of human experience is the presence of objects, with the halo of their own light of self-manifestation about them. To attempt to explain, or worse still, to explain away this primary feature of our knowing, means that we leave the sphere of the consciously known, and enter the region of the unconscious in search of information. Can we penetrate this region and grope there in the hope of "getting behind the returns," and coming back with the secret solved of how our knowledge of objects occurs? And may we use what we thus stumble upon in the dark, unseeing, to refute the evidence of what we clearly see in the open sunlight of consciousness? Should we not rather recognize that the first fact of knowledge is irreducible, presented in its own light, and becoming neither brighter nor dimmer for any artificial light we may succeed in throwing upon it?

These thoughts should give us pause, and make us hesitate before we reject what we know occurs for what we think to be the manner of its occurring. Explanation is not prior to knowledge in point of fact, neither should it be made subversive of it in theory; knowledge and the nature of knowledge are two distinct questions requiring separate treatment. To reconstruct the manner of our knowing means that for the moment we abandon psychology for metaphysics, that we first frame a theory of the knowledge process, and then use it to deny the actual results themselves. This is not investigation, but prejudgment of the most arbitrary kind. Try as we may, we can never make the processes of knowledge as conscious as the results; in one case we are working in the field of observational

psychology, in the other we are making a side-journey into constructive metaphysics. None of the theories which we construct to prove the possibility or impossibility of acquiring a knowledge of objects, affect, as a matter of fact, the results which have come through into consciousness. The objects are there, however we may account for their being there, whether we say it is due to assimilation, projection, substitution, association, parallelism, immediate perception, or what not else.

Any theory, however, which fails to take the facts into account, is doubly mischievous; and that theory alone is worthy of credence, which abides by the evidence, and does not seek to overturn it, but rather to understand and appreciate its full significance. Nothing is to be gained, but, on the contrary, much will be lost by inverting the order in which the object and its image appear in consciousness, or by attempting, as the pragmatists do, to make the object devour the subject entirely. The last cannot be thus at will made the first, nor the first last. Metaphysics is a source of real enlightenment, when constructed after the facts and in continuity with them. But, when metaphysics is employed to anticipate the verdict of experience, or gainsay it, we are engaged in the idle pastime of intellectual fence. The door of consciousness is open at this early stage of perceptive knowledge. It is not closed until we begin to turn inwardly upon ourselves by reflection, and then, of course, the mind becomes its own object and investigates itself. It is perhaps this ingrained confusion of the ontological consciousness, where the door always stands wide open, with the psychological consciousness, where the door must perforce remain ever shut, that, more than anything else, has led philosophers to regard the mind of man as hermetically sealed to all influence from without. The "policy of the open door" would benefit philosophy as well as trade.

Self-evidence or Criticism?

It is often stated in this connection that a system of philosophy, to be truly "critical," and not "naïve," as is the plain

man's view of things, should have for its preface a definite theory of the possibilities and limitations of human knowledge, under pain of amounting to nothing more in the end than a mixture of incipient darkness and subsequent light. The necessity of a theory of knowledge to any well-ordered world-view that pretends to be scientific, no one, least of all the present writer, will take it upon himself to deny. The only question is as to the place which a theory of knowledge may rightly occupy, and the legitimate function with which it shall be entrusted. It is wrong to take it for granted that a theory of knowledge is in its rightful place, when located at the very threshold of consciousness, like a majordomo, with definite instructions to let nothing in or out, as is the case with the doctrines of idealism and psycho-physical parallelism. We have the evidence of results to show that objects somehow or other elude the vigilance of the door-keeper, and succeed in effecting an entrance. What need is there for additional evidence concerning the mode of entrance, before philosophy may be started on its luminous way? If the "naïveness" of the plain man must be gotten rid of at all hazards, is the case for an enlightened philosophy really bettered any by the substitution of a lot of presumed sophistication in its stead?

This is the whole question in a nutshell. Philosophers insist that the unconscious processes by which knowledge is acquired be made as evident as the conscious results themselves, and they go so far as to deny to these results the name or the dignity of knowledge. They take all the facts of simple apprehension, and along with them all first principles, out of the domain of the known, and transfer them bodily to the category of blind faith or impulsive belief. This is unfair and arbitrary. What right have we, in reason or in sense, to test actual knowledge by a metaphysical theory which we construct concerning the manner of its acquisition? Should not our definition of knowledge be enlarged, so as to include simple apprehension, rather than narrowed so as to exclude it? Knowledge is one thing; and knowledge of knowledge is another. The time and place to get rid of disingenuousness, and to become truly critical,

is in the judgment—that second sight, which gives us conscious control of the evidence offered in the first, and makes us true appraisers of its value.

Criticism should consist in sifting the evidence for reality, not in ignoring it, or in using an ideally possible, but practically unobtainable knowledge to test its truth. Our systems of philosophy should not be written from the point of view of conjectural Martians, but from that of actual dwellers on this planet. For this reason, if for no other, it is decidedly wrong to reject the little which we actually do know for the possible more which we might know, if our mental constitution were other than it is. A theory of knowledge should not be employed, Archimedes-like, to tilt the world over with a lever; its legitimate use is, not to get outside the facts completely, but to get inside them further, and ever further still, in order to see what additional light physics, physiology, and psychology may throw upon the manner as well as the matter of our knowing. Positive light is here of far more pertinence than theoretical.

It is not "naïve" or "uncritical" to take things on their evidence. "We cannot suppose and there is no reason to suppose," says Jevons, "that by the constitution of the mind we are obliged to think of things differently from the manner in which they are."[8] A perceived world is assuredly not the same as an unperceived world. To inquire how we perceive the reality of things is consequently a most natural, sensible question. But to launch philosophy with the supposition that, from the very nature of the case, we can never tell whether we perceive the world, or only a huge apparition of our own making, is not to increase the sum of real knowledge, but the amount of artificial sophistication. What we perceive, and how we perceive, are two questions yielding different results. On the answer to the first, the positive sciences are built; on the answer to the second, philosophy to-day stakes its all. These two questions should be employed to explain each other, and not, as they usually are, to explain each other away. And so it all comes to this, that if we must needs be critical, we should

[8] *Lessons in Logic*, p. 11.

not attempt to go behind the facts of perception, but simply refer ourselves and our theories to the judgment, where the mind does constructive work, and where error as well as truth may, with equal likelihood, be built into the structure of human knowledge.

Presentation and Representation.

The first step in this investigation was not taken until the mental atmosphere had been cleared of the fog of theory. One reward of this careful manner of proceeding has been the illuminating discovery, that knowledge of the world of things first comes to us as a simple fact, preceding all discussion, and not even remotely suggesting, much less arousing, any doubt as to its truth or validity. We know that things are, before we think of discussing what they are, or how, perchance, our knowledge of them was brought about. But if the matter is really so plain, why has it been so commonly called in question by philosophers? Here we make another discovery. The facts are plain, only when regarded in their own native light as simple presentations. But it has not been the custom so to regard them. The philosopher looks at the facts through the foreign light of a theory; he puts on colored glasses instead of using the naked eye. The facts are for him representations, images, doubles, copies, or substitutes, and so the problem of finding out whether the copy is true to the original becomes for him a matter of supreme moment requiring instant decision.

Much ingenuity is not needed to see that this problem is created, not by the facts, but by the theory, the truth of which is always assumed and never proven, that knowledge is essentially a copy, or representation, and cannot possibly be a direct presentation at all. It is strange indeed to find this question concerning the truth or validity of our perceptions raised here so prematurely, when no thought of the externality of the object, and no distinction between perceiver and perceived have yet arisen for the mind; when this or that object is simply seen, and no judgment whatsoever is made as to its inner nature; when the object and its presentation, the reality and

the appearance are one and undivided, and not doubles of each other at all. A judgment concerning the truth or validity of anything requires two terms before it can be rightfully pronounced. What occasion is offered for pronouncing such a judgment in the first moment of perception, when there is as yet but one term distinctly apprehended, to wit, the self-manifesting object?

We say "self-manifesting object" advisedly, because these two are given together in experience. This noun and its companion adjective are always hyphenated in direct consciousness, never actually disjoined. Where then is there any real reason found in the facts, or even suggested by them, for regarding the manifestations as "doubles" of the object, and our ideas as a sort of "second-hand set" of impressions, gathered from "copies" rather than taken directly from the originals? Why should the question of "doubles" be raised where only "singles" are before us? And why, pray, should the critic discuss the question of the nature of the object, where only the existence of the latter is the point at issue? It is all a ghost of our own raising, this shadowy treatment of human knowledge, as if it were a series of "moving pictures," in which everything but the living reality is caught and reproduced; as if the fulness of its yield were but as "a painted ship upon a painted ocean." Such a distinction is not even remotely suggested by the facts. It is only by forcing "reality" and "appearance" artificially apart, and by taking liberties with the evidence, that such a distinction can be conjured up, or carried through with any show of plausibility. And it is this fallacy of separating in theory things actually joined in fact, that enables the idealist, the agnostic, and the pragmatist, to make artificial room for an act of judgment in the first moment of perception, where real room is conspicuous by its absence. The "will to doubt" is therefore stronger here than the "will to investigate and see."

Reality not Hidden Behind Appearances.

What is to be thought of the problem of knowledge raised by this inveterate distinction of "reality" and "appearance"? Is the problem thus raised a fiction, which we may disown, or a fact, which we are bound to consider? Our answer will depend on an analysis of consciousness, and this answer in turn will decide, whether the road of knowledge leads toward idealism and agnosticism, or away from both. To bring matters to a head at once, let us emphatically state the proposition, that there is no object known, or for that matter, knowable by us human mortals, apart from its manifestations; and there is no such problem of knowing proposed for solution by the facts before us. No philosopher, worthy the name of such, ever imagined for a moment that the psychic act, by which we know things, is the same as the physical act, by which things exist in their own order of being; or that, to make knowledge truly possible, things and ourselves should go through the performance of exchanging our respective individualities. Why continue to divide philosophy, as medicine is divided, by the theories of homeopath and allopath? We cannot know the absolute absolutely, but only relatively, and there is no need and no profit in regretting that a mutual exchange of visits cannot be satisfactorily arranged between us and things. The necessary condition for knowing anything at all is that it be in relationship with us, and overcome its own isolation and ours by a series of self-manifesting actions. God, the world, man, our own self even, are, and can be, known in no other way. Without this means of self-manifestation, the world would be an utterly unknowable, unrelated, impenetrable blank. This sop may be flung to the agnostic Cerberus, not indeed to stop his barking, but to show that, here at least, his bite is neither feared nor felt.

The agnostic plays his best card when he tries to turn the method of our knowing into a limitation of our knowledge. But to say, as every man must, that we know only related things; and to say, as some men do, that we know only rela-

tions, would hardly, in the latter case, put us on a par for sense and logic with those who make the first statement. And so, we repeat that we know only related things, and that we know the absolute only in and through its relations; for these are the appointed means of all our knowing, and apart from these, objects of any and all kinds would be in our regard thinner than air, more empty than a vacuum. We do not need then to trouble ourselves whether these means of knowledge are theoretically the best that could be devised. Our sole concern should be to discover what knowledge, such as it is, truly yields for us, when investigated according to the circumstances of the case. It is a mistake to prejudge its revelations as impossible.

The fictitious problem, How can we know objects when they are out of reach, severed and sundered from us by the whole diameter of their being and ours, screened from our view, as it were, by a thick curtain of appearances, may be left for solution to those who raise it. Unless, of course, we should feel tempted to ask, who put the object so irrecoverably far out of reach in the first place, who did the sundering and the severing, and who interposed the curtain for the object to hide behind. Is it not high time to banish such imps of speculation? When shall philosophers cease trying to explore Kant's hinterland of "things-in-themselves," and come back to the world, where objects and their "appearances" are one and undivided? An analysis of concrete consciousness shows subject and object actually together. It is only in abstract thought that they seem to fly apart, and begin to show signs of irreconcilable opposition. But that is after the fact, not before it, and this circumstance will bear much more pondering than it receives. It means that the opposition between subject and object is apparent and not real.

We decline therefore all problems not raised by the evidence, and especially the problem which first invites us to suppress the known point of contact between subject and object, and then challenges us to explain how we can ever know the latter. Peering into absolute darkness, making bricks without straw, are operations as much likely to be crowned with final success

as telling how we can know anything, after we have theoretically deprived ourselves of the only means we have for knowing anything at all. It is a blessing, though surely all too well disguised, that such barriers to knowledge are of our own making, that it is we who draw these impenetrable veils between ourselves and things, not they.

Knowledge More than a Copy.

Things farthermost apart are thus found to be in close communion. Concrete consciousness is the meeting ground of opposites. There are other really accessible objects besides ourselves. Doubt concerning this wonderful revelation of consciousness is for the most part due to a misjudgment of the nature of human knowledge. It has been regarded altogether too narrowly and exclusively as a productive power. Production is indeed no small feature of knowledge. The mind reproduces objects in its own way, after its own fashion. But the production that goes on in knowledge is an *accompaniment* of the process of knowing, and not the whole thing. Knowledge is originally and fundamentally an apprehending, no less than a producing, activity. In fact, the productive side of knowledge is secondary and subordinate to its apprehensive side. The proof of this is to be found in the fact that we are directly conscious of apprehending objects, before we become aware, and then only indirectly, that a mental image of the same has also been produced.

The great mistake of critics has been in reversing this order of priority and dependence, so plainly revealed in consciousness. For over three hundred years a constant attempt has been made to reduce the primary feature of knowledge to insignificance, under the pretext of explaining it. If knowing is producing, men have asked, what guarantees the faithfulness of the production? This torturing problem springs wholly from an incomplete analysis. Knowledge and productiveness form a duality that defies all human efforts to reduce it to simplicity.

You cannot suppress knowledge and consider production only.[9] The mistaken notion, that productivity is the complete essence of human knowledge, created the need for the false preface with which modern philosophy begins,—whether or not, namely, we can trust the mind to reproduce faithfully for us the surrounding world of things. A complete analysis of knowledge effectively destroys any such artificial need, by preventing the withdrawal of our attention from the results to the means of their accomplishment.

To know this fatal mis-step is to avoid it. Not without its lesson is the discovery, that by-paths of theory branch off the main road of facts, and lead the traveller nowhere in particular, unless indeed motion in a circle be the most perfect, as the great Stagyrite said it was, with the thought in mind, however, not of systems of philosophy, but of the planetary worlds, where periodic motion is the handmaid of order and of light. It is good to have acquired a definite sense of direction before setting out to discover the well-spring of human knowledge pure and undefiled. There is no little advantage to be gained from acquaintance with the fate of previous explorers, who tried the wrong roads and came back with the tale of their unsuccessful wanderings.

> "One who journeying
> Along a way he knows not, having crossed
> A place of *drear extent*, before him sees
> A *river* rushing swiftly toward the deep,
> And all its tossing current white with foam,
> And stops, and turns, and measures back his way."

EDMUND T. SHANAHAN.

[9] According to the scholastic theory, consciousness is the *instrument*, not the *object* of knowledge, and ideas are a means of *union*, not of *identity* between thought and things. This is the meaning of the famous distinction, "id quod" and "id quo," proposed by the schoolmen. Identity of subject and object is not required for knowledge; union is sufficient. In making identity a prerequisite, modern philosophers have been untrue to the empirical facts which the schoolmen took for guidance.

NOTES ON EDUCATION.

Literature Readers.

Among the primary readers which aim at making the content the dominant element the play readers are objectionable because they treat play as an end in itself instead of utilizing it as a means to an end. The nature study readers make a proper use of play but they are objectionable in so far as they make the study of nature the central element in the child's growing life, whereas all the phenomena in nature that appeal to the imagination of the child should help to lift him above the animal and plant world and should be seen in their relationship to higher things. Finally, we found that the culture epoch readers were objectionable, not so much from a technical standpoint, as from the fact that they embody false doctrines and exert a demoralizing influence on the child's mind and heart, thus placing a positive obstacle in the way of his highest spiritual development.

We must consider in the next place a type of reader which comes nearer to meeting the legitimate requirements of a primary reader than any of those we have thus far dealt with. The purpose of these books is to prepare the child's mind for a sympathetic understanding of the best that is in literature. The advantages of this are so obvious as to render comment unnecessary. A study of this type of reader resolves itself, then, into a search for the answer to these two questions: first, in how far does any given book of this type succeed in realizing the end proposed; and, secondly, is the end, even if fully attained, sufficient?

There are many readers of this type in present use in our schools. The *Stepping Stones to Literature,*[1] may be regarded

[1] *Stepping Stones to Literature,* by Sarah Louise Arnold and Charles B. Gilbert. Silver, Burdette & Company.

as a fair sample. If we omit for the present consideration of the first book of this series, which belongs rather to the class of formal readers than to the content readers, the remaining books of the series aim at presenting in each selection a thought content which is interesting to the child and well within his reach. The drill element, even in the Second Reader, is banished to a subordinate place at the end of the selections, where it rightly belongs. Play and nature study find their legitimate place in these books. They are presented, for the most part, in their right relationship to human life. In general the thought material is wholesome; it frequently contains moral lessons of value, and, what is more, these lessons are not presented in a bald, didactic and repellent manner; they are the heart of the story in each case and can scarcely fail to produce something of the desired effect. The language is excellent and is well calculated to exert a beneficial influence in cultivating the child's taste for good literary form from the very first.

Nevertheless, these books, from our point of view, fail in two important respects: first, the thought content is fragmentary; second, religion, which should form the dominant and controlling element in the child's unfolding life, is absent. The first objection applies to the use of the books in any school; the second is valid only with reference to their use in a religious school.

It is a well recognized principle in primary instruction to-day that we must proceed from the whole to the part, just as in approaching a mountain range the eye first reports the general contour of the range and as we draw nearer separate peaks stand out, and finally the individual rocks and trees are seen. In this way each successive picture is related to the whole through the antecedent apperception mass. This is only an analogue in the mental life of that process in the growth of all living things by which the whole is contained in a relatively homogeneous germ from which it gradually passes through successive stages of unfolding to full epiphany. In the language work of former days the child began his study with a mastery of the individual letters, then he proceeded to combine

these into syllables, and the syllables into words and the words into sentences. But to-day we recognize the fact that the natural process is just the converse of this, and so the child is now permitted to begin his study with the sentence, after which he gradually grows into a consciousness of the individual words, syllables and letters. The mind is unable to hold a mass of isolated material for any length of time and then properly to organize it into a consistent whole. It first develops a generalized picture or framework which serves as an active apperception mass in the assimilation of the separate items.

Now, in the primary grades such readers as *Stepping Stones to Literature,* fail in this respect. They present fragmentary thoughts each of which may be valuable in itself or of value to an older pupil who has sufficient mental development to correlate it with a mental content that has been unified through vital experience. But the child in the primary grades is not in such position, and this method of procedure in building up the thought content is objectionable for precisely the same reasons that the alphabet method is objectionable in building up the linguistic content. It is presenting the leaves and branches first instead of the seed.

The child needs variety, of course, but through all the variety there must run a unity which is strong enough and clear enough to help him to assimilate each new thought that is presented. In the proper time the pupil may be relied upon to deal with a literary content that is isolated and widely scattered, but we must proceed in this direction no faster than his mental development justifies.

The *Stepping Stones to Literature* omit the religious element. This is not only the most important element, from our point of view, but it should be from the very beginning the central and unifying element in the thought content. Verily, it is hard to do without God. But of course, as these books are intended for our public schools, where religious teaching is banished by law, they could not be expected to contain religious instruction.

Religious Readers.

In our Catholic schools all the children are taught Christian Doctrine. Moreover, the teaching of religion is rightly regarded as the most important part of the work, since it is for this purpose that our Catholic schools exist. We have catechisms and special text-books on Christian Doctrine which are used for the periods of formal religious instruction. And, besides, since our schools are taught for the most part by religious, the atmosphere of the school is presumably religious; the very habit which the teacher wears is a sign of consecration to the religious life. But all this is not sufficient. Geographies, histories, readers, in a word, all the texts used in the school must be purged of matter that is objectionable from a Catholic standpoint. Nothing must be allowed to remain which menaces the moral life of the children or which inculcates falsehood in historical matters or errors in religious doctrine. But mere negation will not suffice. Particularly in the primary readers it is felt that the content should be Catholic in tone, and hence we find that lives of the saints, sketches from the Old and New Testament and religious topics supposed to be suited to the child's capacity are interspersed through the Catholic primary readers in current use. All this is well, but it does not adequately meet the requirements of the situation. Religion must be present in the school as the central and unifying element of all its teaching; it must appear in the primary readers, not in isolated and unconnected sketches, but as the central theme to which everything in the book is related. Anything less than this means inefficiency. The consciousness that this is so and the desire to increase the efficiency of our schools in conserving the religion of our people has led to the development of the primary readers which bear the name Religion on the title-pages, not as an indication that they are devoted wholly to religion, but because religion is the central, organic element which unifies the content and in which the familiar phenomena of the child's life and environment are presented in their relationship to God and to the Christian religion.

To arrive at a correct comprehension of the scope and function of these books it will be necessary to make a comprehensive survey of the relation of religious teaching to education in general. This topic is engaging the mind of some of the clearest educational thinkers throughout the English speaking world. Mr. Michael E. Sadler, of Weybridge, England, in his presidential address to the Teachers' Guild, 1909, published in the *Teachers' Guild Quarterly,* under the title "Teachers and the Religious Lesson," presents a very thorough and scholarly view of the situation as it exists in England. Our American educators will find much food for thought in this splendid address, from which we shall quote several passages.

"Politicians of the labor party, orthodox American educationists, Austrian journalists, and English burgesses, worried with a controversy which they do not understand, seem to be unaware that their prescription of secular education is a survival of eighteenth century political medicine. The idea that education is a fagot of 'subjects,' tied together with birch-twigs, out of which you can pull the stick called 'religion' without any serious loss of kindling for the fire, is an interesting bit of pre-biological psychology. Some politicians seem to value these relics of the past as others treasure Georgian samplers or sedan chairs; but the idea of escaping from educational difficulties by just leaving religion out (though by no means extinct politically) is intellectually as old-fashioned as the contemporary notion that the abstract 'economic man' can be conceived of, and observed in action and legislated for, apart from the ordinary citizen with his skin full of many other tendencies and motives, all of them crossing and deflecting one another in the vibrating unity of his life. To leave religious influence out of education is to dessicate it. You may, indeed, pretend to leave it out, with a private hope that its aroma and presuppositions will remain. But that is evasion, not settlement. And the French, who are the real authors of secular education, will have none of such intellectual dishonesty. They know well enough that education fails in its task unless it furnishes its pupils with a firm view of life.

And, therefore, having extracted first Christianity and next Theism from their national course of primary education, they are now trying a rapid succession of new educational religions, turning from Kantian metaphysics to naturalism, and from naturalism to sociology."

The results of the French experiment of banishing religion from the school, begun in the laicization of the primary schools in 1882, is beginning to show itself in the enormous increase in crime in France during the last few years. There has been an increase of 7.5 per cent. in crime during the last year. At this rate crime would be doubled in thirteen years. But the situation is much worse than this would indicate, because the increase in crime is reaching down in alarming proportions to very young children. The actual numbers of juvenile criminals are given as follows for the year: under sixteen years 5,325; between sixteen and eighteen years 9,115; between eighteen and twenty years 17,696; giving a total of 32,136 juvenile criminals. The adult criminals for the same period numbered 158,692. And if twenty-one years be taken as the dividing line, one-fifth of the total number of criminals of France for the year were juvenile. The number of criminals between the ages of eleven and fifteen represents an increase of thirty-three per cent. over the number the preceding year, and between sixteen and eighteen the increase was thirty per cent., between eighteen and twenty the increase was twenty-five per cent. To realize the full force of this alarming situation, it is necessary to remember that out of every ten thousand of the population that were twenty years old there were forty-one criminals, whereas in the adult population of over twenty-one years of age there were only 11.4 per ten thousand.

Now, it should be remembered that every one of the juvenile criminals referred to here belonged to the school population of the dechristianized French schools. They were in attendance, during some period at least of their school life, at the Godless schools introduced by Waldeck-Rousseau and Combes. The Dublin *Freeman's Journal,* commenting on this situation, remarks: " For police offences, as for serious crimes, the maxi-

mum of criminality was found amongst those between eighteen and twenty years of age. That this increase of crime is due to the irreligious character of the teaching admits of no doubt. The increase is mainly in the class of offenders whom the laicized schools have just sent forth. The criminals amongst the population of nineteen and twenty years of age are more than three times as numerous in proportion as the criminals among the adult population. And younger than these, there is an increased band of criminals growing up in the schools, whose teaching has resulted in an increase of thirty-three per cent, or one-third of the number of criminals between eleven and fifteen years of age, and of almost the same rate of increase in juvenile criminality up to sixteen years."

Le Journal Officiel, which published the statistics quoted above, also furnishes this interesting item bearing on the results of the banishment of religion from the schools. "During the first six months of the present year there were 6,201 fewer marriages than during the first half of 1908, and 543 more divorces. The total number of births diminished by 12,692 and there was an increase of 25,019 deaths. Last year the death rate exceeded the birth rate by two per ten thousand, and, so far, there is this year a further diminution equal to one per cent. per annum."

No one familiar with the situation in the United States to-day can fail to recognize the parallel between the situation in France and that in this country. We have proceeded more slowly. Religion was banished from our public schools as a compromise after the gallant fight made by Archbishop Hughes. But the Catholics, the Lutherans and several other denominations maintained separate religious schools. Moreover, the tide of immigration here has been very large so that the results produced by the dechristianized schools have been more gradual. It should also be borne in mind that in this country, until within a comparatively few years, the attitude in the public schools was merely neutral. It is only within the present generation that this has been changed to open hostility and the results are an appalling increase in juvenile crime during the

past few years, an increase in the number of divorces which is a scandal to the whole civilized world, and a low tone of public decency which renders it possible for Maurice Hewlett to find a publisher and an eager public for *Open Country* and H. G. Wells to give to the world under the prestige of Harper Brothers such a flagitious book as *Ann Veronica.*

Educationists everywhere should heed the words of Dean Church,[2] "In the eventful and hazardous interval which all must cross between childhood and manhood, two terrible powers of evil are to be met with in each man's path—ignorance and sin. If education is to have perfect work, both must be encountered, both must be defeated. Education only fulfills half its office, it works with a maimed and distorted idea, unless it deals with character as well as with intellect; unless it opens and enlightens the mind as well as directs, and purifies, and fortifies the will."

The attempt has been made in France and in this country to dispense with religion in the performance of this task and we are just now beginning to realize the magnitude of the failure. We agree with Mr. Sadler when he says: "In the attempt to fulfill this task the educator needs all the powers at his command. How can he (save under stress of necessity) willingly dispense with the power of the faith by which he lives? But it must be the faith by which he really lives. Intense personal conviction—the more moving when curbed in utterance—can alone give to his religious teaching, to his religious influence, the power of persuasion and of intimate moral appeal." Those who do not possess such faith should not be in the schoolroom, and above all they should not be in a primary classroom, where the child virtually lives by the faith of his teacher. But what is true of the teacher is true, albeit in a somewhat less degree, of the text-book. If the work is to be effective, religion must transform everything in the book into its own likeness. There must be no uncertainty of tone. The primary grades are peculiarly unsuited to the voice of controversy: here authority should speak and give firmness to char-

[2] *Paschal and other Sermons,* p. 218.

acter and confidence to the developing mind. The situation demands that the great fundamental truths of religion be presented to the child rather than details or those matters concerning which schools and sects disagree.

Mr. Sadler, speaking of the attitude of the English mind towards the place which religion should hold in education, says: "The spirit of the age has brought into our thoughts about religion a wider sympathy and a wistful regret. We are sensitive to the beauty, the austere grace, of a life which is under willing obedience to a rule of faith. We feel towards it as towards a precious tradition in an art. Violent destruction of it would be a barbarism, a sacrilege. When it asks of us the right to live and work in quiet fulfilment of its task of service, we have no heart to refuse. The fierce desire to eradicate from the world that which we cannot approve as intellectually true finds no place in our mind. We are not merely tolerant, but respectful, of beliefs which we cannot ourselves accept when we see them giving steadiness of moral habit, still more when we see them transfiguring motive, cleansing character of dross and defilement, and bringing rest to tense and harassed minds. And we admire the force of will and directness of aim which come with clear conviction. . . . There grows in our mind a greater certainty of the presence of good, but at the same time a longing for more intellectual coherence in our conception of it. Moral skepticism loses its hold upon us, but, as Richard Baxter said of his own experience, we 'find greater darkness upon all things, and perceive how very little it is that we know in comparison of that which we are ignorant of.'"

We need not pause here to give further consideration to the need of religious training in our schools: our faith in this necessity is amply attested by the fact that we support our own separate schools at the cost of enormous personal sacrifice. But the all-important question for us to consider is how our schools may be rendered more effective in accomplishing the work for which they are maintained, that is, the sending out into the world of Christian men and women, strong in their conviction of religious truth, clean in character and steadfast in

their loyalty to the principles of conduct laid down by Christ and by His Church. Our Lord rebuked His followers for not being as wise in their generation as the children of this world, and we, who are interested in the effective teaching of religion in our schools, should learn a lesson from the history of science in elementary education. On this topic, as on so many others with which we are here concerned, we cannot do better than to quote once more from the presidential address of Mr. Sadler.

"Another factor has also to be taken into account by those who would analyze the forces at work in the present situation. What has been, what is likely to be, the effect of the scientific movement upon the place and prospects of religious teaching in the schools which are supported out of public funds? No other intellectual movements since the Renaissance—with which, indeed, it has some intellectual connection and spiritual affinity—has penetrated so deeply into educational thought and school practice. But for a long time it did little more than add a subject or subjects to the curriculum, with little regard to their connection with other branches of study or heed to unity in their intellectual presuppositions. What was meant by its true pioneers to be a pervasive influence shriveled into an appendage unassimilated with that to which it was joined." This is precisely the situation with regard to the teaching of religion in some of our schools. What was meant to be a pervasive influence has shriveled into an appendage unassimilated with that to which it is joined. How could it be otherwise in those schools where the secular branches are taught in the same way and from the same text-books as in the dechristianized schools and where catechism is added as "an appendage unassimilated with that to which it is joined"? "How often have we blundered in teaching too much religion in the schools, how mistakenly we have pressed upon the minds of children forms of expression, abstract summaries of spiritual conviction which were framed by adults for adults, not for those of tender years"!

To return to the theme of science in the school. "And the temper of the English mind was favorable to a working com-

promise which allowed much natural science to be taught without any serious encouragement of the scientific attitude of mind, even in that part, and still less in other parts, of the course of study. Gradually, however, the achievements of physical science in the material world have produced a change in men's habitual judgment as to the relative urgency of different parts of the school training. Scientific knowledge has become not only a necessary part of personal equipment for most callings in life, but an indispensable element in general culture, and therefore in a liberal education. Its claims have pressed upon the school time-table, and have produced congestion or readjustment. By slow degrees the relative importance of the religious lesson has appeared to decline. The perspective has imperceptibly changed. And now we are witnessing the rapid advance of that school of educational thought which makes the care of the body and the development of the physical powers a dominant part of the duty of a school."

We can and should learn a lesson from all this. The claim of religion to hold a central place should not be set aside in favor of secular elements, at least in those schools that are supported for the express purpose of fostering the teaching of religion. There is another lesson, too, in all this for those who care to read it. God, in His own good time, draws good out of evil, and the very scientific spirit which of late has grown to dominate the schools seems destined to play a leading role in reinstating religion where it of right belongs, at the heart of the educational process. To quote again from Mr. Sadler: "Some of the recent influences of scientific inquiry are in certain respects conducive to the maintenance and deepening of the religious instruction given in schools. Physical studies are accustoming us to a conception of the universe which is far removed from the stiff and imprisoning materialism of an earlier age. The biological view of human development prepares us to assign to spiritual forces, to will and faith and self-sacrifice, a great part in the furtherance of the individual and social welfare of men. It has thrown emphasis upon the corporate view of human life, upon the interdependence of the

several parts of the social organism, upon the moral elements in associated effort. Psychology presses upon our notice the power of belief, of self-surrender, of obedience to an ideal. And, under the influence of scientific method, historical and anthropological studies have thrown new light upon religious development, have set the records of the spiritual experience of mankind in truer perspective and have given a new significance to our study of the Bible. Coherence and unity begin to form where once was discontinuity of thought with discord of presuppositions. Most powerful among all the causes which are producing the change is the diffusion of the scientific attitude of mind. By this I mean the desire to see things as they really are; the learning under authority how to see them; the habit of direct and accurate observation, of exact record, of patient investigation; the brooding over facts observed at first hand; the practical use of the imagination in the framing of hypotheses; strict self-discipline in sifting and testing their adequacy to the facts; the cleaning away from the mind mirror of those defects of bias, inaccuracy, partiality, timidity, which ploughed its surface; and the gradual acquisition of that subtle insight, that power of judgment and of discrimination, that instinctive sense for trustworthy guidance which are gained through long experience and concentrated effort in the right conduct of the understanding. The scientific temper of the mind finds material for study and judgment in the facts of spiritual experience as in the facts of the physical order of nature. It brings both within its focus of vision. To each it assigns its independent value. And it cannot rest content with any view of life or of scientific investigation which excludes either from its field of observation and of inference."

The development of science and the diffusion of the scientific spirit are making it clearer every day that religion must form an integral part of any education which will meet the needs of society, but they are also making it clear that such teaching of religion cannot and must not be an isolated portion of the school work. They are demanding that every item in the curriculum be examined in relation to religious thought and feeling.

If this is to be effective it must begin in the primary grades and find its place preëminently in the text-books which are placed in the children's hands and in the instruction which accompanies such text-books in the first few years of the school period. If this is done effectively, the older pupils will be eager to trace the relationship of the creature to the Creator which binds in unity and coherence the divergent phenomena of the world in which they live. Then science instead of leading our children away from God and religion will lead them to a joyous recognition of the fact that in Him we live, move and have our being. Mr. Sadler recognizes the advent of such an attitude at present in England. We in America are apparently much further from such a realization. "Thus there is emerging from the study of natural science a temper and an attitude of mind intimately favorable to religious thought, and adverse to any plan of early education which would exclude from the child's training help in learning to notice and become familiar with the facts of spiritual experience. But it is doubtful whether we have yet seen the full effects in education of the earlier and more limited view of science which regarded spiritual experience as an alien problem and suspected any training in the study of it as an influence hostile to itself. One of the tragic things in educational history, as in politics, is the results of some early stage in speculation realizing themselves in practical affairs long after the course of speculation itself has passed into a new stage and has provisionally reached other conclusions. It is possible that some uprush from below of opinions generated by a crude and now discarded materialism may sweep for a time from education much that the true leaders of scientific thought would, on the whole, prefer to leave there than roughly to discard."

Those responsible for the policy of our Catholic schools must not lose sight of the fact that just in proportion to the failure of public schools to develop moral character in their pupils is the difficulty of our task increased. The constant intercourse between the children attending Catholic schools and those children who attend the dechristianized schools renders greater

efficiency in our schools necessary. The religious training that would have sufficed under other conditions is destined to ignominious failure in the present situation. Above all things, compromise must be avoided. The toning down of our schools so as to make them harmonize with the dechristianized schools is nothing less than betrayal of the cause of Catholic education. We cannot serve two masters. Only an uncompromising stand for principle and thorough and efficient methods in the teaching of religion will, under the present circumstances, succeed. And through this course only may we hope that God's blessing will rest upon our sacrifices and our efforts. Moreover, it is only through a consistent policy of this kind that we may hope to retain the respect of our non-Catholic fellow citizens.

Speaking of the changes in administrative outlook and in political opinion in England, Mr. Sadler says: "Four other changes have strengthened the position of religious teaching in our national education:—(1) Historical and social inquiry has emphasized the value of the service which schools in close association with religious bodies have rendered and are rendering in English education, not least among the poor in town and country. In 1870 the conventional liberal view was that denominational schools were a survival from the past which the growth of public administration would slowly but surely make redundant. This view, though still by no means without its adherents, has not gained ground of late years among those who have made a first-hand and comprehensive study of the facts." We are still in the position, in this respect, that obtained in England in 1870. It is scarcely balm to American vanity to realize that we are forty years behind England in our treatment of this problem.

"(2) Secondly, for a variety of reasons, the Roman Catholic claims are more fully recognized in English political and social life than was the case forty years ago. The House of Commons is more responsive to Roman Catholic arguments; the Board of Education is well acquainted with the devotion and skill of many of the Roman Catholic educators. The result is that whoever surveys the educational position in England has

to take account of the tenacity of the Roman Catholic Church in maintaining the schools which are under its own influence and control. It would be no easy task for any government to withdraw all grants of public money from the Roman Catholic schools in London and Lancashire. And this fact has a wide bearing, because few English people would now propose to grant privileges to one religious community which were denied to others." Evidently the genuine merit of our Catholic schools in England has contributed to their achieving their present strong position. We are in the habit of boasting of our broad-mindedness and of our native sense of justice in this country, but we have a long road to travel before anyone could truthfully say of us what has been here said of England.

The third change mentioned as strengthening the position of religious teaching in the elementary schools of England is the lessening of the friction among Protestant denominations and the increased tendency towards united effort in missionary and social work.

The fourth factor in the case is thus stated: "Fourthly, the supreme importance in education of the influences which strengthen moral principle and character is admitted by all who watch the development of modern education. It is by no means the case that all those who are agreed in attaching the highest value to the character-forming work of the school believe that it is desirable or necessary to retain theological teaching in the school curriculum. But this new phase in the educational thought of the world has drawn attention to the power of religious influences in giving that firm view of life which, on the intellectual side, is one of the safeguards of sturdy character. And, in consequence, the argument for religious teaching as an integral part of school training has been materially strengthened."

If the religious influences in our schools are to produce the results which are expected of them and which the parents and supporters of our schools have a right to expect, the work of religious instruction and the moulding of the characters of the children under the influence of religious ideas must be thorough

and systematic: half-way measures will not suffice. Our teachers are working with a zeal and an enthusiasm in the cause of religion which is truly edifying, but while the methods of secular instruction have constantly improved under the inspiration of recent scientific developments in the field of applied psychology, the same can scarcely be said of the teaching of religion. While some advance has been made, the efforts have been more or less fragmentary and isolated. In this matter the teachers are hardly to blame. In the secular branches they are helped by appropriate manuals and text-books, while in religious instruction they have been compelled, for the most part, to remain content with survivals of a former phase of education.

The need of improved methods in the teaching of religion and of text-books constructed along right lines is keenly felt by our Catholic teachers throughout the country. They justly complain that results are expected of them of an order quite incompatible with the instruments placed in their hands.

It has been insisted upon that one of the chief needs of the child in the primary grades is unity and close correlation in the material of instruction. The necessary variety must be secured through diversity in the manner of presentation. We sin against this principle when we place in the child's hand in the first and second grades a separate text-book of religion, whether we call it catechism or Christian Doctrine, or by whatever name we choose to designate it. The same objection may be urged against this procedure, which has been urged successfully against the introduction into these grades of special text-books in any other subject. A single text-book is sufficient; it should stand as a symbol of unity to the child. Call the book reader, if you will, but in so doing you emphasize the formal side of the art of reading and relegate the content to a subordinate place. In a former article we pointed out the objections to this procedure. The dominant and central element of the child's first books should be religion, and the art of reading, as well as instruction in all other subjects, should be made subordinate to this central theme, hence the name Religion

should attach to the books instead of Reader. It is for this reason that the name Religion, First Book, and Religion, Second Book, have been given to the books which we have issued for use in the first and second grades respectively.

Evidently, therefore, in considering a suitable book for the primary grades, its efficiency as a reader is not the only problem that should engage our attention, nor, indeed, is it the chief problem. Our first question must be concerning its efficacy in bringing religious truth and religious influences to bear upon the formation of the child's mind and character. This, of course, involves the whole question of catechizing young children, but it should be remembered that while this is the central problem before us, there are many other problems related with it which must be solved at the same time before we can produce a work that is wholly acceptable as a child's text-book; the requirements of a reader must be rigidly maintained as well as the requirements of a book designed to impart the first rudiments of the various departments of human knowledge.

The catechetical problem here involved has received careful consideration from many saints and teachers of the Church from the very earliest days of Christianity, but literature in English on the subject is limited. One of the most valuable recent contributions to it has come from the able pen of the Reverend Lambert Nolle, O. S.B., Priest of Edington Abbey and Professor of Liturgy and Catechetics at St. Mary's Central Seminary, Oscott, England. The book was published in 1905 by B. Herder and Company, under the title *The Catechist in the Infant School and in the Nursery.* It should be in the hands of every catechist and every primary teacher in our Catholic schools. We can do no more here than present a few extracts from the first part of the book which deals with general principles.

We hardly need urging in the matter of beginning catechetical instruction as early as possible. The only question is how to make the instruction to the very young effective. Father Nolle begins his work with a section on the importance of catechizing infants. "Bishop Ketteler, of Mayence, a very

experienced spiritual guide, gives a strong reason for commencing religious instruction at an early age. He says: 'As a rule, man remains in the same religious disposition as he was when he was six years old.' This is also the reason why the Westminster ritual urges parents to teach their children the principles of the Christian faith and the duties of a Christian life as soon as they can speak.[3] These words do not merely contain an advice, but they express a strict duty, which parents have to discharge either by themselves or by other capable persons. Whether parents are or are not willing and capable of personally complying with this obligation, they all expect the infant schools to take a very large share in the work. In cases where the parents do little or nothing for the religious education of their children, the school must do a double work. It must not confine itself to religious *instruction,* but must devote even more energy to religious *education.* The latter ought in all cases to be considered as the more important end of catechizing. Father Furniss, the great apostle of children, reminds us that 'clever and sharp answers or a good memory are not sufficient to make a good Christian, and when a child in after life is fighting his way through the temptations of the world, he will have to draw far more largely on his stock of piety than on his stock of knowledge.'[4] Therefore, our aim ought to be to make our infants simple and devout souls, who may know little of religion and still less of catechism, but whose conscience, affections and will are formed aright."[5] Evidently neither Father Nolle nor Bishop Bellord would rest content with making children in the primary grades memorize the answers to a number of questions in the catechism; their imaginations must be captured; their hearts must be taught to love; and their actions must be performed under the inspiration and guidance of religion. This is precisely what we have attempted to do in Religion, First and Second Books. The truths of religion are not neglected; the great fundamental

[3] Address after Marriage, Append.
[4] Sunday School, p. 31.
[5] Bishop Bellord, *Religious Education*, p. 38.

truths in the Lord's Prayer and the first half of the Apostles' Creed are there presented to the child in such a way as not only to be assimilated by him but to govern his conduct and his thoughts and aspirations.

Father Nolle points out very clearly the need of method in teaching catechism to children. In speaking of the three ends, to please, to instruct, and to move, which the catechist should ever have before his mind, he says: "The last is the most important, viz., that he should move his hearers, the other two are simply means to this end. So catechizing must, above all, be practical, and, though this is the last end, it must be the foremost in the catechist's mind when making his plans for the year or preparing his lessons. The choice of topics, of the examples by which he illustrates the truths, of the means by which he makes the lessons attractive, must all be subservient to this end. The principal truths which he must above all bring before the children are the truths absolutely necessary for Christians. They are but few in number, viz., the existence of God, the Creator of the world and the rewarder of good and evil, the Blessed Trinity and the Incarnation. There is no reason to fear that these topics do not receive sufficient time and attention; on the contrary, they often seem to be overdone. Why should the instruction of infants be limited to a few chapters in catechism, instead of giving them some idea of their chief duties, and helping them to lead Christian lives? Some parts of the 'Christian's daily exercise' will be much more useful for this purpose, than a philosophical talk on the three powers of the soul, and a comparison of them to the Blessed Trinity. The most difficult philosophical ideas are not suitable for infants, and the senseless repetition of them will not make them Christians, but rather hinder them from becoming such. Our time could be spent much more profitably by making the principal truths intelligible to them; only then can we hope to move their wills and make religious ideas the motives of their actions."

Father Nolle is here speaking of the instruction to be given in the English public schools where the religious program is

necessarily a separate element in the day's work, but it is evident that his remarks apply with equal force to our own Catholic schools, and they apply with peculiar force to the text-books which should be put into the hands of our little children in the primary grades.

Father Nolle is not alone in holding the view which we have just quoted. The best authorities in the Catholic Church have given frequent expression to the same thoughts. Archbishop Messmer[6] is merciless in his denunciation of the practice of compelling little children to memorize the abstract statements of the catechism before they are in a position to understand the meaning. "Since our mental powers, no less than inanimate nature, depend on certain unchangeable laws, religious instruction must keep in view these laws of the mind. To neglect them would render instruction ineffectual. Nature is stronger than man and obeys him only who first obeys her. For this reason the catechist must pay attention to the following principles:—1. Early religious instruction must be historical not doctrinal. The mind of man reaches the abstract through the concrete; from perceptions he goes to ideas, not *vice versa*. Hence, to use a small catechism for first beginners or little children is against sound pedagogy, as it rests on the false supposition that abstract doctrine must go before concrete teaching. 'To make them (little children) learn by heart chapters of the catechism which they cannot possibly understand, is simply to weary and disgust them. The only thing they should learn by heart is their prayers and some hymns, not as an exercise of their intellect, but that they may gain the habit of saying them, and that carefully and reverently, as a duty to God. With this they should receive oral instructions on the great truths of religion . . . . illustrated by stories from the Bible. Explanations of doctrine little children cannot take in.' For this reason, in explaining the doctrine of catechism, we should set out from concrete objects; hence, where possible, with Bible stories, but by no means with the catechism text."

[6] *Spirago's Method of Christian Doctrine*, edited by the Rt. Rev. S. G. Messmer, D. D., D. C. L., Benziger Brothers, 1901, New York, pp. 189 ff.

In contrasting the improvement in the methods of teaching secular subjects with that in the teaching of religion, Father Nolle says: "The Education Code of 1902 gives us some very useful indications: *a.* What children between the age of five and seven can do: picture lessons, object lessons, story lessons, recitations . . . Now, let us ask ourselves, whether we bring our religious instretion down to a level, that it becomes as easy or nearly as easy as these other subjects? Are the things which we make the children memorize, as simple and intelligible in idea and wording as their nursery rhymes? Are we trying to work upon their undeveloped intellects through the senses and the imagination, or do we treat them as philosophers by giving them a large amount of abstract terms and logical conclusions? Do we speak to them in their own language, *i. e.*, in simple words and short sentences; or do we throw at them metaphysical and theological terms and long periods which convey just as much meaning to them as if we addressed them altogether in that language from which the terms are borrowed? How plain and simple are the addresses of Our Blessed Lord and His Apostles, recorded in the New Testament, or the instructions which the holy Doctors of the Church gave to their Catechumens. And yet they all spoke to adults. They knew that beginners cannot bear much, that there must be room for gradual development. Therefore, St. Paul found it necessary to give them only milk and not yet solid food; because they were little as far as faith and spiritual strength were concerned, is it not even more important for us, to bear this in mind when dealing with those who are little in every respect, but especially as regards their intellect? The only way to do them justice is to stoop down to them, and lead them up gradually step by step. First of all we must remember that their power of abstraction is very little developed. Their ideas are not clear; they do not as yet grasp essential differences, but distinguish the things from each other by some external and striking features. Our treatment of religious truths can, therefore, only start with similar ideas; we ought to use descriptions instead of definitions bristling with technical terms. 'Such a defi-

nition,' says Father Glancey,[7] 'cannot but leave a blank.' It might be suggested that the terms might be explained somewhat one by one, and then the children would know something of the definition. Such a suggestion ignores the fact that the children at this age are not capable of a long process of reasoning; that, by the time the second term is explained, they have forgotten what they knew of the first, and that, therefore, they do not really gain any knowledge by putting the words together."

This practice of teaching catechism to young children from the Baltimore catechism at an age when they are incapable of understanding the definitions still lingers on in some of our schools. These misguided teachers insist that the poor children memorize the definitions of the catechism and leave the explanation to a later period when the children's minds will be sufficiently developed to understand the meaning of what they have learned. The practice, however, is condemned by all the leading authorities on catechetics. Archbishop Messmer [8] is very emphatic in his condemnation of this practice. "Explanation must always precede memorizing. Learning by heart without previous explanation is at variance with the Christian principle 'faith comes by hearing' (Romans x, 17) and is a misuse of the truths of religion. If things are explained only after the children have learned them by heart, they will pay no attention to the explanation, as they know that at the test it is quite sufficient to know the answer by heart, and memorizing will engage their whole attention. To make children first learn a thing by heart, to be explained later, is not psychological, but a crime against the mind of man. Memorizing is only a means to make the truth already understood by the mind a lasting possession. Words memorized, but not understood, are like a veil hiding heavenly truth from the mind, like a closed door denying access to the food of the soul."

Bishop Bellord, in his admirable little book, *Religious Education and Its Failures,* attributes a large share of our losses

[7] Introduction to *Knecht's Commentary,* p. xi.
[8] *Op. cit.,* p. 191.

to the defective methods of teaching religion which still linger on in our midst. He says (p. 18): "During late years methods of education have been fundamentally changed. A definite science and art of education have been created, grounded on principles of psychology and on the ascertained characteristics of children's minds. . . . Under the influence of this idea school books have been rewritten; every device has been tried to excite interest, to save time and labor and to fix the attention; parrot learning by rote has been reduced to narrow limits, and words are employed, not as being valuable in themselves and identical with knowledge, but as subsidiary to ideas, and only as the vehicle for conveying them. Catholic methods of religious instruction have not kept pace with those adopted for secular subjects. Education in religion is carried on in the obsolete wearisome manner of past centuries. The character of the child's mind and the special needs of the time have not been considered in our methods, and consequently the child's willing coöperation is notably absent. The sacredness which belongs to the ancient doctrines has been unfortunately regarded as attaching also to the antiquated process of teaching them. The children of light were unwilling to gather hints for their religious advantage from the children of this world who are so wise in their own generation. Thus catechism became the most difficult of tasks, and children could not but contrast it unfavorably with their other studies and learn to dislike it."

Father Nolle is in substantial agreement with this statement. He says (p. 14): "But the treadmill of fifty years ago has not quite disappeared in religious instruction. The excellent theologians who wrote our catechism nowhere stated that their book was meant for infants. No man could compose a book which could be used with advantage in the infant school and in the seventh standard. Why should, therefore, the little children be forced to learn some of the most difficult questions contained in it?" Canon Ryan writes in a similar vein in the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, November, 1900: "I some time wonder if, catching up the full spirit of the founders of the kindergarten, we dispensed with almost all formula in teaching the catechism to very young children, to infants and First Book certainly, I

wonder what effect would come. I do believe a very good effect would follow." Canon Ryan refers to St. Jerome in support of this position.

Father Nolle calls attention to the fact that when religious teaching is presented to the children in a dry and uninteresting form in definitions which they are compelled to memorize, the effect is not only to hinder the development of the understanding, but to interfere with the emotions and the will. "If religious instruction is made for them the most difficult task, if they cannot but contrast it unfavorably with their other studies, what wonder if they dislike not only the catechist, but, what is worse, religious instruction too. But as the latter represents God to them in such an unattractive way, it is quite natural that the little ones will not learn to love God. If such a dislike has taken hold of an infant's mind, it will prove a much more serious obstacle to religious training in later years than any amount of ignorance. Such a result would lay an awful responsibility on the catechist's shoulders. His duty is not to make the child learn a certain number of formulas or texts (if necessary by sheer force of his will or even by punishment), but to help him to love God and our holy religion. A neglect of this principal duty would be equivalent to a misrepresentation of God's perfections, it would be little short of a betrayal of our most sacred trust. We shall not be excused by saying that the children cannot understand religion. If this were true, it would be better not to instruct them in it at all than to make them dislike it. The truth, however, is that the great mysteries of Divine Revelation are hardly more difficult to children than to grown up people."

The truth of this statement is amply borne out by our experience. Religion, First Book, presents to the children some of the great fundamental truths of the Christian religion, such as the Creation, the Divine Sonship, the Redemption, the Nativity, etc., and even very young children find the book an endless source of delight. The reports reaching us from the numerous schools where the book is in use mention this fact without a single exception. In many instances it is stated that the children take the books home and that the younger members

of the family learn the stories by heart before they are able to read. The ordinary catechisms are eminently unsuited to children in the primary grades and no amount of explanation and illustration can transform them into suitable books for children in this phase of development. This has been felt by most scientific catechists. Dealing with this phase of the subject, Father Nolle says:

"When speaking of plain and pleasing catechizing, we gave reasons why the ordinary catechisms are unsuitable for infants. In order to overcome the inconveniences resulting from their use, attempts have been made to simplify the answers and thus to make smaller catechisms for younger children. This procedure, has, however, led to confusion, because the children had later on to learn different answers to the same set of questions. Besides, it is a waste of energy to learn things which shortly after have to be unlearned. The method of beginning religious instruction at an early age with the learning of difficult and unintelligible formulas can only be justified on the principle that the child should become accustomed to acept Revelation on the authority of the Church. This principle is in itself good, but its application in this case is not altogether happy. . . . Some leading members of the teaching profession have suggested to use only Bible History in the lower standards. They lose sight of the fact that the telling of stories may be an entertainment (if well done) and also a cultivation of the imagination and perhaps of the intellect, but not a training of the will. If, on the other hand, the Bible stories are meant to convey the necessary teaching and training, and if they are arranged and treated accordingly, then we have a kind of catechism. The question would then be: which topics are to be chosen, which truths and practices are to be inculcated? It is remarkable how much effort has been made to solve the question of a catechism for infants. It is at the same time regrettable that few have noticed the fact that the Church settled this question centuries ago and that we cannot do better than follow her guidance. The catechumens of the first centuries were taught the Our Father and the Apostles' Creed; Biblical stories illustrated the truths contained in the two

prayers and also the moral lessons taught to them; besides they were prepared for the sacraments they were about to receive. . . . . The words of the Lord's prayer, the Hail Mary and the Creed are much easier for little children than most of our catechism answers. If Bible stories of the Creation, of the fall of our First Parents, and some chapters of the New Testament are judiciously used, both to illustrate the truths contained in the ancient catechism of the Church and to impress upon the children their most important duties, they will learn all they need, and in addition to it, doctrine, history, practice and devotion, will come to them as an organic whole. (This arrangement will also secure the 'concentration of instruction' and the 'progress in concentric circles' so loudly and justly demanded by modern education.) While helping them to lead Christian lives according to their age and capacity, we shall also lay a solid foundation on which future instruction and education may be built up without removing a single particle."

The plan here outlined is embodied in its completeness in Religion, First and Second Books, although Father Nolle's book did not come into our hands until after these text-books were printed. But this is not surprising for the idea is not new. "This scheme," says Father Nolle, "was proposed some seventy years ago by Archbishop Gruber, of Salzburg, and recently again by Bishop Messmer. The fact that it is not yet introduced everywhere is partly due to the want of literature on catechizing infants, partly to hyperconservatism. New methods are not welcomed by all, if they demand more effort and more preparation. It may not be very entertaining, but neither is it very troublesome, to make a class of infants repeat the same catechism answer over and over again. One can even mark registers or do other work during the time, and no preparation is needed. But apart from the harm done to the children, is not this caricature of the Church's method a reason why modern educationists, instead of admiring the Church and studying the secret of her wonderful educational power, hold her up to scorn and ridicule as obsolete and mummified in her methods?"

THOMAS EDWARD SHIELDS.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Exempel-Lexikon fuer Prediger und Katecheten, der heiligen Schrift, dem Leben der Heiligen und andern bewährten Geschichtsquellen entnommen, edited by P. A. Scherer, O. S. B., 2d. ed. by Johannes Bapt. Lampert, O. S. B. and others ; 4 vols., large 8°. B. Herder, St. Louis, 1906–1909. $3.60 per volume.

Das Missale als Betrachtungsbuch, Vorträge über die Messformularien, von Dr. Franz Xavier Reck ; three volumes 8°. Herder, Freiburg, pp. 516, 388, 610. $5.00.

1. Among the many homiletic "subsidia" published of recent years few, if any, offer the preacher a greater utility than this excellent work. It is an alphabetically arranged list of historical examples illustrative of the truths of religion, but so treated that each title often offers the sketch of an entire exhortation enriched with apt examples from the Holy Scriptures, the lives of the Saints, and the history of the Church. Each title is treated in a logical and orderly manner ; the Scripture references are exactly given, and the original sources, *e. g.*, lives of the Saints, are usually indicated. Of course the compilers were bent chiefly on illustrating the religious truth in question, and do not pretend to vouch for the historical accuracy of every example quoted. They take this vast and interesting material as they find it in the best hagiographical works. We recommend strongly to young preachers the habitual use of this fine Catholic dictionary of examples ; they can acquire from it, and in an easy, pleasing way, not only a rich fund of happy anecdotal material, but also valuable theological guidance of a very practical and immediate nature. The large work is by no means a mere hasty compilation, but offers on every page evidence of careful disposition, earnest concern for the preacher's convenience, a wise and kindly feeling for the hearers, a sensible broad view of the religious problems, cares, and concerns of our own day. An exhaustive index permits the reader to grasp quickly all the material pertinent to a given title wherever scattered through the four volumes. With some important modifications the work is worthy of an English translation, and would probably have a wide sale in the new world-language.

2. Not only the young priest but the experienced guide of souls will find in these three volumes abundant suggestions for the brief homiletic discourses usual on Sundays and holidays. The author has in a commendable way taken the very language of Holy Church herself, thoughts, prayers, aspirations and exhortations consecrated by the use of her saints, her clergy and her faithful through many eventful ages, and from them all has drawn new comfort, consolation, and instruction for his readers. No preacher could fail to profit by a previous use of the material given here in the due order of the ecclesiastical calendar. Taken together with Dom Laurence Shepard's English translation of "Guéranger's Liturgical Year," this work offers to both reader and speaker a rich fund of religious considerations and reflexions, whose immediate source is the wisdom of the Holy Catholic Church herself. The volumes are also an excellent commentary on "The Missal for the Laity," and though originally composed for young theologians, are yet serviceable to all classes of older readers, and seem destined to hold a high place in our newer homiletic literature. A very good index adds to the charm and utility of the important work, and makes it easy to bring together on a given point a great many utterances of Holy Church, all of them charged, so to speak, with her faith, hope, and charity, her sanctity and power, her tender humane temper, and her infinitely varied experience of all the moods and phases, all the strength and weakness of the human heart. *Qui legit intelligat!*

THOMAS J. SHAHAN.

The Science of Ethics. By Rev. Michael Cronin, M. A., D. D., Volume I, General Ethics. Dublin, 1909. Pp. xx, 655. (Sold by Benziger Bros., New York, Cincinnati and Chicago.)

This is the first volume of a work on the Science of Ethics by Dr. Cronin, formerly Professor at Clonliffe College, Dublin, and recently appointed Professor of Ethics at the National University of Ireland. It treats of the general principles of Ethics and is to be followed by a volume on Special Ethics, which will apply those principles to particular cases. The most striking characteristic of the volume which has already appeared is solidity, in the best sense of the word. Dr. Cronin does his thinking along the lines of traditional Aristotelianism and Scholasticism ; he adopts that point of view frankly and fearlessly, and does not sacrifice depth and thoroughness to the desire for such

effect as may be attained by superficial brilliancy, epigrammatic sententiousness or striking originality of illustration. Modelling his style on that of the Angelic Doctor, with whose works he is so well acquainted, he eschews all the devices of cheap rhetoric and expounds his doctrine calmly, dispassionately, with studied plainness of speech. For this reason, he may disappoint the reader who is either unwilling or unable to put into the study of Ethics a certain amount of mental strenuosity. Dr. Cronin does not write for the amateur. His work will, no doubt, be all the more appreciated by those among the more serious students of philosophy, who have hitherto sought in vain for an authoritative exposition in English of the fundamental principles of scholastic Ethics.

After defining the Science of Ethics and determining its scope, Dr. Cronin treats in succession of Human Acts, The End of Human Action, Good and Evil, Moral Criteria, Freedom and Morality, Duty, Stoicism, Hedonism, Utilitarianism, Evolution, The Moral Faculty, Intuitionism, Synderesis, Consequences of Morality, Habits and Virtues, Law and Rights. Under the heading Human Acts, he introduces many questions which are not generally to be found in modern treatises on Ethics. At first, one doubts whether he is wise in doing so. But, as one proceeds in the work, it becomes evident that the author could not well have dispensed with the metaphysical and psychological distinctions which he explains so satisfactorily in his introductory chapter. It will, indeed, come as a surprise to many students of Ethics to find Dr. Cronin maintaining, as he rightly does, that the primary criterion of morality is "*the natural and unnatural use of a faculty.*" It is generally taken for granted that scholastic Ethics receives its character from Christian dogma, and that it is primarily theonomic. Very few, even among those who should know, are aware that scholastic Ethics is based on metaphysical and psychological principles which are reasoned out, not revealed. Scholasticism is more *human* than it is represented to be. Scholastic Ethics is based on rational deductions, not on divine mandates. Duty, of course, rests ultimately on the Eternal Law of the Supreme Lawgiver ; at the same time, the immediate primary criterion of right and wrong is not a law imposed from without, but a law inherent in the nature of man, and in the character, function and purpose of his faculties. Perhaps Dr. Cronin is optimistic in his belief that "we have no difficulty in accepting the general Aristotelian principle that the formal and final principles of things prove each other" (p. 127). But, whether there is, or is not, difficulty in accepting it, the principle is the foundation of scholastic Ethics.

The chapter on Evolution and Ethics is one of the best in the book. Here the author's talent for clear and dispassionate exposition is seen in conjunction with his ability to reach the root of a difficulty and lay bare the flaw in a specious contention.

The book, in general, is a creditable and valuable contribution to the literature of scholastic philosophy. Among its many theses and theories there are some, of course, to which one may take exception and still be a scholastic. It is to be regretted that so many inaccuracies, especially in the titles of German works, have been allowed to pass the proofreader. And, it does not look well in a work of this kind to find so many quotations at second-hand. Why should Dr. Cronin quote Mivart from the pages of Father Gerard's "*Old Riddle, etc.*" and not from Mivart's own works?

WILLIAM TURNER.

Dictionnaire apologétique de la foi catholique, sous la direction de A. D'Alès. Fascicule II, Aumône-Concordats. Col. 321–640. Paris, G. Beauchesne, 1909.

The second instalment of the Apologetic Dictionary has issued from the press and brings to its interested readers the studies of able scholars on a number of important questions. The Catholic view of almsgiving, judiciously set forth by the Abbé Antoine, is followed by a long, comprehensive article by Father Condamin, S. J., entitled *Babylon and the Bible.* The writer notes the many features common to the religions of ancient Babylon and Israel, emphasizes the important differences as well as the striking resemblances in the Babylonian and Bible stories of the creation and of the deluge, and makes a careful comparison between the recently discovered Code of Hammurabi and the Law of Moses. The outcome of this comparative study is, not that the Hebrew people borrowed from Babylon, but that much in both religions has come down from a remote, common traditional source. At the same time, the freedom of these traditional elements from gross polytheistic notions in the Hebrew religion, as well as the absolute superiority of its lofty monotheistic and ethical teaching, offers strong proof in favor of its divine origin.

The Abbé D'Alès gives in twelve pages a masterly review of the spirited controversy on the question of the rebaptism of heretics that threatened to disrupt the Church in the days of St. Cyprian. The unsatisfactory article of the late Father Guilleux on Giordano Bruno is happily an exception to the general excellence of the contributions

to the present number. A few of them, as the *Cabale des Devots*, and the unduly long article on the alleged Criminality of the French Clergy have but little interest for foreign readers. On the other hand, there are a number of articles of general interest and importance that are finely presented. Among these may be mentioned the Catholic Canon of Holy Scripture, by the Abbé Mangenot, the Religions of China, by Father Wieger, S. J., the Devotion to the Sacred Heart, by the Abbé Du Bouays de la Begassière, the Church Councils, by Canon Forget. The dictionary is bound to widen its circle of influence as time goes on.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

La Survivance de l'âme chez les peuples non civilisés, par A. Bros. Paris, Bloud et Cie, 1909. 12mo, 64 pp.

The Abbé Bros is already known to many readers by his interesting work, *La religion des peuples non civilisés*. The present little treatise on the belief of primitive peoples in the survival of the soul after death has been prepared to furnish an additional booklet to the long series of useful studies published by Bloud under the general title, *l'Histoire des religions*. Following the line of investigation laid out by Tylor, Spencer and others, the author shows how the crude psychology of uncultured people leads them to take dreams, subjective visions, etc., as realities, and in consequence, to view the soul as the airy counterpart of the body, capable of leaving the body temporarily in sleep and swoons, and existing apart from it at death. It is conceived as having the same characteristics, the same needs, the same occupations in the next life as in this. Hence the custom practically worldwide of burying with the dead the things thought to be needed by the departed shade in the world of spirits. The warrior is buried with his spear or club, the wife with cosmetics and cooking utensils, the child with its favorite toys. On the grave of the chief the faithful dog or horse is dispatched, and not infrequently wives and slaves to keep him company and minister to his needs in his new home. Food offerings are likewise made, giving rise to ancestral worship.

In the last few pages, devoted to the question whether in the belief of uncultured people the future life is in any way determined by the good and bad deeds of the present, the author is a little disappointing. He seems to be too much influenced by the assertions of Tylor,

Marillier and others that the notion of retribution in the life to come is practically absent in lower religions. A stronger case might be made out for the opposite view than that which the author presents.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

Le Brahmanisme, par Louis de la Vallée Poussin. Paris, Bloud et Cie, 1909. 12mo., 126 pp.

This little treatise is meant to be a companion volume to the one on Vedism, likewise contributed by the author to the Bloud series of the *History of Religions.* It aims at giving a succinct account of the complicated religious system that developed out of the ancient religion of the Vedas, and which later gave rise to the various forms of sectarian worship in India known as Hinduism. There was a twofold Brahmanism, the Brahmanism of popular belief, and that of the pantheistic schools. The author tells of the caste system, the successive states of student, householder, and ascetic. He touches on the domestic rites of marriage, burial, sacrificial offerings to the god of the hearth and to other deities, the sacred banquets to the *pitris*, or departed relatives. He also describes the speculative, pantheistic scheme of salvation as taught by the schools of ascetic philosophers and embodied in the so-called *Upanishads.* To make his exposition more effective, he gives by way of appendix, amounting in size to one-fourth of the booklet, a free version of Samkara's interpretation of Upanishad doctrine, taken from Deussen's *System des Vedanta.*

In preparing this concise account of Brahmanism, the author has given proof of wide reading, incorporating many citations from the Brahman texts. Yet, excellent as the work is, it leaves considerable to be desired. In a treatise on Brahmanism why should next to nothing be said of the doctrine of *karma* with its implied chain of rebirths? Why should we not be told of the Brahman pessimistic view of earthly life, of the popular belief in salvation by the accumulation of personal merits, of the ironclad rules of conduct springing from the Brahman notion of transmigration? His statement that the Brahman student, in order to learn the four Vedas, had to spend forty-eight years in the home of his *guru* or teacher (page 20), observing in the meantime strict chastity and simplicity of life, needs to be toned down very substantially. Marriage among the Brahmans took place early in life, and could not be entered upon, as a rule, before the period of studentship was completed.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

Der Alttestamentliche Kanon der Antiochenischen Schule. Gekrönte Preisschrift von Dr. Ludwig Dennefeld. (Biblische Studien. XIV. Band, 4. Heft.) Herder : Freiburg im Breisgau, 1909. 8°, pp. 93. $.75.

The fourth century of the Christian era forms a most important epoch for the history of the Canon of the Old Testament. It is the age in which we find several attempts to fix definitely the number and authority of the canonical writings. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, St. Athanasius and others, holding authoritative positions in the Eastern Church, drafted lists of the sacred books, designed for the guidance of the faithful. In consequence of Jewish influence, the Palestinian Canon was normative for these catalogues and effected the omission of the deutero-canonical writings. The latter were not entirely rejected, but they were considered secondary in importance. For the rest, both the frequency and manner of their citation are proof sufficient that they stood in high regard and were held to be inspired. It is the purpose of Dr. Dennefeld's introductory chapter to set forth the fact that all the Greek writers, who proposed a defective Canon of the Scriptures, were directly or indirectly dependent upon some center of Jewish culture. The most noteworthy of these were Alexandria and Jerusalem. The Christian communities which originated in these places were made up to a great extent, of converts from Judaism. As a result it is not surprising that their Canon was limited to the books which the Jews held in authority, and that they considered those works less important, whose canonicity was denied or controverted. All Greek writers, whose Canon excludes the deutero-canonical works, were influenced by the beliefs and discussions of these cities. The historical connection is traceable in each individual case. Birth and intellectual training, literary dependence and other indications declare the existing relationship. Similarly the Latin Fathers, St. Jerome, Rufinus and St. Hilary, were influenced by Palestinian views. From this source we cannot obtain the true Canon, adopted by the Western Church, and formulated after the lapse of many years by the Council of Trent. The case is different when we come to the school of Antioch. The members of this institution did not experience the influence of the Alexandrians. Therefore presumption favors the opinion that from them we might derive the complete Canon. Does investigation bear out the presupposition? Dr. Dennefeld has set himself the task of answering this question and he answers it most

satisfactorily. He has collected the evidence contained in the surviving literature with much care and exactitude. Lucian and his immediate disciples, the great Antiochians, Diodorus of Tarsus, St. John Chrysostom, Polychronius and Theodoret, as well as subsequent writers are consulted for their testimony. Not one of them has drawn up a formal list of the sacred books, a fact which plainly indicates that the consensus of opinion rendered instruction on this point unnecessary. No distinction is made between proto- and deutero-canonical parts of the Old Testament. With but one exception, they subscribe to the collection of books contained in the recension of Lucian, which included also the two apocrypha, III Macchabees and III Esdras. This version was official in the school. It proceeded from the hands of its founder, a presbyter, and a person of authority. Moreover, the same had consciously retained the disputed portions against the verdict of the Hebrew Bible. The exception referred to is Theodore of Mopsuestia, who occupies a solitary position in departing from the attitude common to the entire school. He makes notable encroachments upon the Palestinian Canon and rejects much that was venerated by the whole of christendom.

It is the merit of this scholarly study, that instead of arranging the texts in purely chronological order, it groups them according to their mutual relationship, according to their local and historical dependence. This methodical procedure gives consistency to the investigation and at the same time explains the puzzling differences among the Fathers. As a clear presentation of the doctrine, that obtained in the great exegetical school, it supplies a long-felt want in the history of the Canon.

A. MENGES, O. S. B.

Enchiridion Historiae Ecclesiasticae Universae. Auctore P. Albers, S. J., ad recognitam et auctam editionem Neerlandicam alteram in Latinum Sermonem versum. Tomus I : Aetas prima seu christiana antiquitas, Annis 1–692. Neomagi (Nijmegen) in Hollandia. Sumptibus L. C. G. Malmberg, MDCCCCIX. Pp. vi + 328. 8°.

This Latin translation, is in reality, because of the many additions and emendations, a new edition of the work in Dutch by Father Albers. As the work covers such a long period, and deals with the multiplicity of topics which come under the consideration of the

church historian nowadays, it stands to reason that because of its size, detailed consideration or discussion of any subject cannot be expected. The order and arrangement are good, and the author has made a commendable and generally successful effort to indicate the best literature on each period or topic. In the material arrangement of chapters and headings the convenience of students has been constantly kept in mind and very judicious use made of black-faced type which cannot fail to be an aid to memory. The work is pre-eminently one for beginners in history who will need the aid and direction of a teacher if its pages are to be of vital interest. The author's references for Christian writers are nearly always to the Migne edition. This may be for the sake of uniformity but it would be better for students to grow accustomed to the use of the best modern critical texts. There are in some cases later editions of some books than those referred to. One striking feature of the work is the large place given to the works of Catholic authors. On the whole the work is a good specimen of that species of historical Handlexicon, chronologically arranged, which goes by the name of Manual of History.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Thomas William Allies. By Mary H. Allies. Benziger Bros., New York, 1907. Pp. 208. 12°.

That wonderful intellectual upheaval in England, called the Oxford movement, is likely to be a subject of perennial interest. The sterling intellectual qualities not less than the strong moral fibre of the men whose names are connected with the movement must undoubtedly save it from oblivion. It may be too soon to write the history of that movement, but such books as this by Miss Allies, will be guides of inestimable value to the future historian as showing the qualities of head and heart of the men who were its leaders. That this biography of Thomas Allies is sympathetic goes without saying, but there is no line which can be regarded as an exaggeration, no trait described which is overdrawn. Whenever possible diaries and letters and such sources as speak for themselves are employed, and the author's personality sedulously kept out of view. Of very special interest to many people will be the chapter dealing with the struggles and labors entailed by the preparation of the famous work, The Formation of Christendom. Though brief and unpretentious (even to the exclusion of a Preface),

this little work is a charming piece of biography, and ought to be welcomed by the many whose lives were influenced by those of Newman and Allies and by all who love high deeds and noble lives.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Vie de Saint Euthyme Le Grand (377-473): Les Moines et L'Église en Palestine au V^me^ Siècle. Par Le R. P. Fr. Raymond Senier au convent Dominicain de Jerusalem. Paris, Victor Lecoffre. (J. Gabalda & Cie), 1909. Pp. xxxii + 301. Avec cartes et illustrations hors texte.

This work is the first volume of a new collection of *Études palestiniennes et orientales*, which will be published under the direction of Pére Lagrange, the learned editor of the *Revue Biblique Internationale*. No more appropriate subject could be chosen for the first publication in the series than a life of St. Euthymius, because of the historical connection between this fifth century monastic hero and the monastery in which the author now resides. When the talented and lively Eudocia, consort of the Emperor Theodosius II, had taken refuge in Jerusalem towards the close of her life from the carping tongues in the court at Constantinople and the suspicions of her husband, she was for a long time the mainstay of the monophysite party in the Holy Land. Though the influence of St. Euthymius she was brought back to the true fold and at once showed the sincerity of her adhesion to the decrees of the Council of Chalcedon by her efforts in the cause of orthodoxy. One of the most striking examples of her zeal was the church which she erected near Jerusalem in honor of St. Stephen the Protomartyr. A monk, Gabrielius, from the Laura of St. Euthymius was placed in charge of this new basilica and its adjoining monastery and was made at the same time bishop of the surrounding diocese. From the time of its construction 460 A. D., until its destruction by the Persians in 614, the church of St. Stephen was a living memorial to the faith of Eudocia and the zeal and sanctity of Euthymius. The fanaticism of the destroyers removed practically speaking every vestige of this famous sanctuary. Twelve centuries later some French Dominicans raised on the same spot a new monastery and a new church as a place of study and prayer, and hence the sentiment of veneration and love which dictated the composition of this book.

The author has not found anything new to add to the Life of the Saint, written by Cyril of Scythopolis in the middle of the sixth century and drawn from personal narratives of those who knew St. Euthymius ; but he has provided a very valuable setting for the incidents contained in the narrative of the original biographer. There is an introductory chapter on Palestinian Monasticism which is especially valuable for the geographical information which it conveys. The author, however, will not find many who will support his contention that monasticism in Palestine originated with Charito. St. Jerome's testimony on this subject cannot be set aside by the statements of an author who lived at least a century later (p. 9). Besides the interest attaching to the life of this famous ascetic, who played such an important rôle in the history of Palestinian Monasticism, there is much to be learned of the general history of the church in the fifth century from the perusal of the pages of this book. The chapters on the Councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon will do much to illustrate some phases of the doctrinal controversies of the period, while that on the Laura of St. Saba will be of value in studying the history of the Mass. The illustrations are well chosen, but being on such a small scale do not aid the text very considerably.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

NECROLOGY.

Cardinal Satolli.

Cardinal Satolli, Prefect of the Congregation of Studies, Archbishop of the Lateran basilica, and Bishop of Frascati, died at Rome, January 9.

Francesco Satolli was born at Marsciano, July 21, 1839. He was educated at the seminary of Perugia and after his ordination received the doctorate in Rome. For several years he taught philosophy in Perugia and attracted the attention of the Archbishop, Cardinal Gioacchino Pecci. When the latter became pope, he appointed Satolli to the chair of dogmatic theology in the College of Propaganda and to a similar position in the Roman Seminary. In the revival of the philosophy of St. Thomas, inaugurated by Leo XIII, Satolli took a leading part. To his immediate students he imparted a share of his own enthusiasm for the teaching of the Schoolmen, and to the larger circle of his readers he afforded guidance by his published commentaries on the works of Aquinas. As professor and author, he combined in a remarkable degree depth and accuracy of thought with elegance of expression and a warmth that was eloquent. These qualities he also displayed in the pulpit, justly winning thereby the reputation of an orator.

In 1888, Satolli was appointed Titular Archbishop of Lepanto, and in the following year he took part, as representative of the Holy See, in the Centenary celebrated at Baltimore. At the inauguration of the Catholic University, November, 1889, he was present and delivered a characteristic address. On his second visit to this country in 1892, Mgr. Satolli resided for a time at the University and gave a course of lectures on the principles of Thomistic philosophy. He was shortly afterwards appointed Apostolic Delegate, and November 29, 1895, was

created Cardinal with the title of Santa Maria in Ara Coeli. Towards the close of 1896, he returned to Rome and in 1903 became Bishop of the suburban see of Frascati.

While thus advancing to the highest dignities in the Church, Satolli was always at heart a teacher. He maintained to the last his interest in the neo-scholastic movement and in the institutions of learning by which it was furthered. The thorough education of the clergy was, in his judgment, an all-important means both of turning to profit the best elements of modern thought and of combating the errors of the age. With the needs and the possibilities of the Church in the United States he was well acquainted, and he followed with close attention the development of Catholic educational work. Gifted with ability of a high order, he was favored also by many opportunities of inaugurating measures and institutions destined to render signal service to the Church and to society. That he gave to each undertaking the whole energy of a determined will, was expressive not so much of the diplomat as of the man who felt that he had a mission to perform.

R. I. P.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

Donations. One hundred thousand dollars has already been received from the Estate of the late Mrs. Lusby, of Baltimore, Md.

One hundred thousand dollars was received recently from a friend of the University, whose name is, by request, withheld for the present.

Public Lectures. The following is the list of Public Lectures to be delivered Thursday afternoons at half-past four in McMahon Hall, during the Winter Term.

Jan. 13—Hypnotism : Its Uses and Dangers.
Very Rev. EDWARD A. PACE, D. D.

Jan. 20—The Backward Pupil.
Rev. THOMAS E. SHIELDS, PH. D.

Jan. 27—A "New Religion" Without Religion.
Rev. JAMES J. FOX, D. D.

Feb. 3—The Origin of Religion.
Very Rev. CHARLES F. AIKEN, D. D.

Feb. 10—The Rise of the Temperance Movement.
Hon. WILLIAM H. DELACY, LL. D.

Feb. 17—What Temperance Means for the Child.
Hon. WILLIAM H. DELACY, LL. D.

Feb. 24—Life and Works of Dante.
Right Rev. Monsignor THOMAS J. SHAHAN, D. D.

Mar. 3—Dante as a Philosopher.
Rev. WILLIAM TURNER, D. D.

Mar. 10—The Celtic Sources of the Divina Commedia.
JOSEPH DUNN, PH. D.

Gifts to the Library. Among the recent donations to the Library are: Two hundred and three volumes on Education from Very Reverend Dr. Edward A. Pace; six additional volumes on the Congo, from Mr. James Gustavus Whiteley, of Baltimore, Md.; a set of the Icelandic *Sagas* from Rev. Father Southgate, of Brookland, D. C.; seven volumes of Thorpe's

Federal and State Constitutions, through the kindness of Senator Gallinger; two volumes on Apologetics, from Very Reverend Charles F. Aiken.

The Feast of the Conversion of St. Paul. On January 25, the Feast of the Conversion of St. Paul, patronal feast of the Faculty of Theology, was celebrated in Divinity Chapel, Caldwell Hall. Solemn High Mass was celebrated by Very Reverend John D. Maguire, Ph.D., Dean of the Faculty of Letters, and the sermon was preached by Very Reverend John Cavanaugh, C.S.C., President of Notre Dame University.

The Catholic School System in the United States

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